

CURRENT *History*

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APRIL 1963

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Coming Next Month

May, 1963

EAST EUROPE

The May issue focuses on conditions in East Europe, and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the satellite nations and their stability as a bloc. Seven articles include:

Yugoslavia

by FRED WARNER NEAL, *Professor of International Relations and Government, Claremont Graduate School, and author of "War and Peace and Germany";*

Bulgaria

by L. A. D. DELLIN, *Associate Professor of Economics, University of Vermont, and author of "Bulgaria";*

Czechoslovakia

by IVO DUCHACEK, *Associate Professor of Government, City College of New York;*

Poland

by RICHARD F. STAAR, *Professor of Political Science, Emory University, and author of "Poland, 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People";*

Hungary

by FERENC A. VÁLI, *Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts, and author of "Rift and Revolt in Hungary—Nationalism versus Communism";*

Albania

by WAYNE VUCINICH, *Professor of History, Stanford University, and author of "Serbia between East and West";*

East Germany

by CARL G. ANTHON, *Professor of History, American University.*

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CURRENT History

APRIL, 1963

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In this issue, seven specialists discuss West Germany's growth since the establishment of the German Federal Republic in 1949. Our introductory article focuses on the stability of West Germany's political system and the achievement of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. "The greatest miracle of the Adenauer era is, perhaps, that the overwhelming majority of Germans today identify themselves with the democratic institutions and policies of the Federal Republic. . . ."

The End of the Adenauer Era

By CARL G. ANTHON

Professor of History, American University

ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1944, under cover of night, three Gestapo men stopped in front of the Nister Mühle, a sleepy inn in the Westerwald mountains. They pointed a blinding searchlight at the house, piercing the window of the very room in which their victim was sleeping. Inside, the fugitive, recently escaped from a concentration camp, instantly grasped the situation and, seized with terror, ran to the attic for cover. A few minutes later, the Gestapo men mounted the attic steps and as their flashlight spotted their man, one of them exclaimed: "But Herr Oberbürgermeister, really!"

The Oberbürgermeister thus addressed was Dr. Konrad Adenauer, for sixteen years lord mayor of Cologne (1917-1933) and since 1933, intermittently pursued by Hitler's secret police. He recovered from the shock immediately and with a characteristic voice

of authority said: "With your permission, I shall have my breakfast first. . . . May I invite you to have a cup of coffee with me?" The somewhat non-plussed leather-clad agents succumbed and joined their prisoner for an eerie breakfast of genuine (rather than ersatz) coffee and homemade cake.

Subsequently they delivered Adenauer to Brauweiler prison near Cologne. There the Gestapo commissar in charge said to him: "Now, please don't commit suicide. You would only cause me no end of trouble. You're sixty-eight years old, and your life is over anyway."¹

On the day of his capture by the Gestapo, Adenauer "celebrated" his silver wedding anniversary. Five years later he was to be chancellor of a new Germany risen from the ashes of the old. Almost 19 years later, aged 87, he was still head of his party, head of the government and one of the acknowledged leaders of the free world. Churchill had called him the greatest statesman since Bismarck; like Bismarck, the imperious master tailor of the united Germany, Adenauer had

¹ Quotations from Paul Weymar, *Adenauer: His Authorized Biography*, Peter de Mendelssohn, trans. (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1957), p. 145f.

fashioned the new Germany distinctly after his own measurements.

As Fritz Allemann aptly pointed out in a recent, perceptive article in *Der Monat*, Adenauer at the height of his career could say of himself as Louis XIV had done, "L'état c'est moi!"² For almost 15 years Adenauer has been undisputed master in the house he built. His stern, immovable figure has also dominated the European stage so that historians will no doubt agree in labeling the period of 1949 to 1963 the "Adenauer Era."

Today there are unmistakable signs that this era is coming to an end. Not only is the moment of his resignation as chancellor in sight—it will presumably occur by next fall—but the very ingredients of the era, political stability, economic surge, social and cultural vitality, seem to be evaporating. The *élan vital* of postwar reconstruction is ebbing. A wave of restlessness, discontent and frustration has been spreading over the land during the past two years, accentuated by such calamities as the erection of the Berlin "wall of shame" (on August 13, 1961) and the *Spiegel* affair in the fall of the following year.

Mounting criticism of "Bonn"—the very word has a strong pejorative connotation for many and represents a cover-all symbol for official life and institutions in Western Germany—is evident among intellectuals, the political parties (including Christian Democrat ranks), and the press. A much publicized "Memorandum of the Eight"³ by such prominent scientists as Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and other prominent cultural personalities criticized not only the allegedly sterile and illusory foreign and defense policies of the government, but also the conservative social and economic policies. This dissatisfaction found expression in the parliamentary elections of 1961 which resulted in a sharp increase in opposition

votes and forced Adenauer to enter a most unhappy *marriage de convenance* with the Free Democrats (F.D.P.)

ANTI-ADENAUER FEELING

The *Spiegel* affair served as the spark that set the whole accumulated anti-Adenauer sentiment aflame. The spontaneous outburst of protests of press, parties, and public against Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, the assumed culprit in the affair, and against the Bonn regime in general, was reminiscent of the spirit of 1848.⁴ This democratic demonstration, in which the Allied reeducators of the Germans might well take pride, produced not only a serious government crisis, breaking asunder the cabinet so recently and laboriously formed; far more ominous than that, it undermined for the first time confidence in the young republic as a *Rechtsstaat*, a state in which the rule of law prevails. Some isolated voices—the noted historian Gerhard Ritter,⁵ for example—warned against reckless exaggeration of the issues involved (by unwarranted references to "Gestapo methods" and so on) which must lead to public mistrust of the republic as had happened before in the Weimar Republic.

Whatever the consequences of the *Spiegel* affair, things will never be as before, as Friedrich Sieburg pointed out in an editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (November 10, 1962). One can hope that the revelation of inadequacies (largely human) in the government will lead to a genuine critical reappraisal and reform. Many critics had hoped that the cabinet crisis might lead to a "grand coalition" between Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) and Social Democrats (S.P.D.)—and negotiations with S.P.D. leaders were actually carried on by Bundestag deputy Freiherr von Guttenberg (Christian Socialist, allied with C.D.U.)—but that was not to be.⁶ Moreover, those who had expected governmental reforms, such as the elimination of several expensive and perhaps superfluous ministers, were doomed to disappointment.

All that came out of the turmoil was a patching up of the cabinet, with Kai Uwe von

² Fritz René Allemann, "Die Tragödie Konrad Adenauers," *Der Monat*, No. 172 (Berlin: Jan., 1963), p. 12.

³ Reprinted in *Die Zeit* (U.S. edition), March 9, 1962.

⁴ For an excellent, balanced appraisal of the affair see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Jan. 5, 1963.

⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nov. 16, 1962.

⁶ *Die Zeit* (U.S. edition), Dec. 21, 1962.

Hassel, the 45-year old Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, replacing the controversial Franz Josef Strauss as defense minister, and several other less exposed cabinet posts changing hands. Though the noisy, reckless *Spiegel* had accomplished its objective, no one expected basic changes in defense policies from Strauss' successor. The cabinet reshuffle amounted to a rejuvenation of personnel perhaps, but *der Alte* stayed on. Although Adenauer's critics had demanded his resignation, cooler heads agreed that *this* was not the occasion for ending an incomparably illustrious political career. The end would come, but it should come in a dignified manner.

AFTER "YEAR ZERO"

To appreciate properly the significance of the Adenauer era it is necessary to recapitulate the political developments in Germany since 1945, the "Year Zero" when chaos broke over the land. During those last days of the Third Reich, shortly after the American First Army had crossed the Rhine at Remagen, there appeared two American officers at Adenauer's beautifully situated villa in Rhöndorf above the Rhine where he had "cultivated his garden" during most of the years of Nazi rule. The officers asked him whether he would be willing to resume his old post as mayor of Cologne. Considering the hopelessness of the situation and the inauspicious prospects of Occupation rule, the macabre desolation of what once was a proud, flourishing city, and above all, considering Adenauer's age and health (effects of prison life), it would have been more than natural for him to decline the honor.

But Adenauer had continued to take an active interest in German politics and he was determined to do his part in the reconstruction of Germany. His experiences under a ruthless, atheistic dictatorship had led him to a searching reexamination of the foundations of political life. As a political refugee he had spent one year at the ancient Benedictine monastery of Maria Laach in the remote Eiffel hills. There he studied intensively such fundamental Christian documents as Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and Pius

XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), both of which emphasized the need for social reform to attract the workers away from Marxist and atheist doctrines. These reflections led to a renewed conviction in Adenauer that society and politics must be based on Christian ethics and principles to ensure justice and freedom.

The outlines of his Christian democratic program, to be developed later in the Christian Democratic Union, were conceived during those years of "political exile" and from these fundamental principles Adenauer never wavered. His whole career as leader of the C.D.U., his domestic and foreign policies as chancellor, must be understood in the light of that background. To be sure, he had been a national figure in the Catholic Center party in the Weimar days, but 12 years of totalitarian rule and war convinced him of the necessity of new political action in a radically new situation. Many other surviving Weimar politicians had gone through a similar process.

It was natural, therefore, that political leaders and groups from many different parties who had carried on ideological warfare against each other before 1933 were now ready to join hands under one common Christian banner. The diversity of views and programs in fact necessitated a union of parties, so that the Christian Democratic Union licensed by the occupying authorities in 1945 in the four zones, first on a local basis only, was an amalgam of rather heterogeneous groups. It comprised Protestants as well as Catholics, Northern centralists and Southern federalists, industrialists and bankers as well as union leaders, Christian socialists and free enterprise individualists. It also attracted a good many former Nazis, most of them minor followers, whom Adenauer wished to give a chance to be reintegrated in a moral society.

This conglomerate party, which was conceived as a common receptacle for all votes opposed to socialists and anti-Christians, was given ideological and organizational cohesion through Adenauer's strong, dominating personality. With a tenacity and determination

rarely encountered among septuagenarians, and with supreme confidence and almost stoic patience, he systematically and even ruthlessly imposed his influence and leadership over the new party.

The official C.D.U. program that helped the party to victory in the first parliamentary elections in 1949 was overwhelmingly the product of Adenauer's conceptions. The party was fortunate in having a leader who instinctively sensed the needs and desires of the majority in those uprooted times and who was sufficiently flexible in his ideas and tactics to be able to steer his young party skillfully through the maelstrom of postwar conditions. In this he proved far more shrewd than his great adversary, Kurt Schumacher, who was rebuilding the S.P.D. and preparing for the power which he was certain would fall to him and his party in view of its democratic and uncompromisingly anti-Nazi record.

Schumacher had the older party and an efficient, centralized party organization. With his sufferings under the Nazis—ten years of concentration camp—and his physical disabilities—an arm lost in World War I and a leg amputated shortly after the Second—he seemed a man marked by destiny for leadership in a new Germany. But he was too rigid, too highstrung, too "difficult," and his blind confidence in his person and his cause prevented him from making necessary compromises.

Still, the S.P.D. came very close to winning the first Bundestag elections, securing 131 seats against the C.D.U.'s 139. But Adenauer was in a better position to negotiate a coalition with the two smaller parties on the Right, the Free Democrats (F.D.P.), a new version of the liberal Democratic Party of Weimar days, and the German Party (D.P.), a new conservative party with strong regional ties in Northern Germany and with a strong component of ex-Nazis. Adenauer refused to entertain the idea of a "grand coalition" with the S.P.D., as advocated by left-wing

C.D.U. leaders, partly because of his ideological convictions and partly because of his personal dislike for Schumacher.

The C.D.U.'s program as developed by Adenauer represented a felicitous combination of domestic and foreign policies which exactly fitted the postwar situation. On the domestic side, the program's chief ingredient was the concept of "social market economy" propounded by Professor Ludwig Erhard and already applied with some success in the Bizonal Economic Council. Adenauer adopted and promoted this concept in the C.D.U. for it fitted well into his social philosophy, his ideas of individual freedom and private enterprise tempered by concern for the common welfare. The rightness of Erhard's doctrine seemed borne out in the first year after the currency reform imposed by the Allied authorities in June, 1948. Subsequent years of dynamic growth and prosperity revealed the C.D.U. as the party of success and condemned the Social Democrats to permanent and frustrated opposition.

FOREIGN POLICY


But for Adenauer, as for Bismarck, the pre-eminent part of his program was foreign policy and here his genius was to guide Germany onto totally new territory. Whereas Schumacher, misreading the signs of the times, advocated a new, almost aggressive nationalism, partly to compensate for the internationalism of the prewar Socialists, Adenauer propounded a new European order.

For him it was not merely a matter of reconstructing Germany—and quite realistically, what was left of Germany, namely, west of the Elbe river—but beyond that, Germany as a part of a western European commonwealth. In 1946, Adenauer said in a speech in Luxembourg, on his first trip to foreign territory since the war: "Today I regard myself primarily as a European and only in the second place as a German."⁷ These were not just words for the benefit of his international audience; this was a genuine confession of faith. The Swiss journalist who on that occasion said of him, "C'est un homme!" (There's a man!),⁸ rightly estimated the

⁷ Weymar, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁸ *Ibid.*

MAP OF GERMANY



U. S. Department of State, Publication 7257, August, 1961.

stature of the man who was to be one of the greatest statesmen in mid-century.

By identifying Germany with Europe, Adenauer was giving German aspirations a new, a loftier goal than the outworn one of national sovereignty and power which had led the German nation to catastrophe. This would also give Germans a chance to play a larger role in an integrated Europe and thus replace German nationalism with European nationalism. No doubt his concept of a united Europe was strongly influenced by his Catholic *Weltanschauung*; and his close subsequent collaboration with French and Italian leaders would seem to bear this out. His vision of an integrated, continental "Little Europe" suggests indeed a modernized version of the medieval Carolingian empire whose territorial confines bear a close resemblance to the "Six" (particularly as far as Western Germany is concerned). To achieve this united *Abendland* is Adenauer's overriding aim and his chief motivation for clinging to power.

C.D.U.'S SUCCESS

Adenauer's election to the chancellorship by the first Bundestag, if only by the slender majority of one vote (his own), proved decisive for the political development of the Federal Republic. It meant that he and his party could look forward to four years of uninterrupted rule—the term of a Bundestag—for under the Basic Law the chamber can express lack of confidence in a chancellor only by first electing a successor. By means of this clever constitutional device the Federal Republic has been able to avoid the instability that characterizes parliamentary government in such countries as France or Italy, or for that matter, in Germany before 1933. Thus, the great concrete economic and political achievements of those first years, the "economic miracle," the gradual attainment of sovereignty, the return of the Saarland, the accession to the European Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and the Nato alliance, in short, the reestablishment of Germany as a great power, could be claimed by the C.D.U. and its towering leader.

It was therefore a foregone conclusion that the popularity of the party would grow as long as success continued and—a vital factor—as long as *der Alte* remained at its head. After four years of rule, the C.D.U. increased its representation in the legislature from 139 to 243 seats, and after four more years, to 270 seats, thus attaining for the first time in German parliamentary history an absolute majority. This represented the apex of Adenauer's power and prestige at home and abroad. He had given Germany a period of extraordinary stability and prosperity. His reelection to the chancellorship in 1961, albeit under less favorable circumstances, signified almost 14 years (to date) of unbroken rule under one chancellor. This period equals the whole lifespan of the Weimar Republic which had seen 13 chancellors and 21 cabinets come and go.

In salutary contrast to Weimar, also, the political party constellation was far simpler and more durable. The first Bundestag had seen some eight different parties apart from the two major parties, the C.D.U. and the S.P.D. Today, it has only three parties altogether, the C.D.U., S.P.D. and the Free Democrats (66 seats). This remarkable development was the result of a new electoral law which eliminated any party from representation in the legislature if it failed to obtain at least five per cent in a national election. Thus, all the smaller parties fell by the wayside, including the German party which had formed part of the Adenauer coalition for 12 years. The danger of party fragmentation, the curse of the Weimar Republic, has been overcome and the possibility of extremist parties playing a parliamentary role has been considerably reduced. In addition, parties who in their program and organization attacked the basic democratic order, such as the Communists and the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party (S.R.P.), have been banned by decision of the federal constitutional court.

Not only has there been a marked trend toward a two-party system but the ideological gulf separating the main contenders is rapidly being narrowed. The Social Democrats, languishing in political exile, have been forced

to take stock and in a series of "agonizing reappraisals" have discarded most of their ideological baggage and most of their cherished foreign policy principles. At their party congress in Godesberg in 1959 they divested themselves of all Marxist ballast, omitted references to the nationalization of industry, and adopted an empirical program of benevolent political, economic and social reform on the basis of democracy and communal welfare. They have abandoned their neutralistic and pacifistic notions and have come around to accepting squarely the Western alliance and Nato with all its military implications. They have avoided an unequivocal position with regard to atomic arms for the German army and the government's proposal for a national emergency law (which would give the federal government special decree powers as did paragraph 48 in the Weimar constitution). Against considerable internal criticism, especially from its intellectual wing, the Social Democratic party has toned down its oppositionist stance to such a degree that its program has become scarcely distinguishable from that of the government.

As in the Anglo-Saxon countries, German political parties are becoming pragmatic and opportunistic, offering, not alternative programs and policies, but merely alternative men to occupy government posts. This gradual homogenization of political life leaves little room for strongly individualistic or radical parties. The Communist party, for example, had withered away for lack of support long before it was outlawed. Similarly, none of the variously suppressed or reemerging rightist reactionary and neo-Nazi groups have been able to obtain seats in the Bundestag since the 1953 election, although the German Reich party (D.R.P.) won around 300,000 votes in 1957.⁹ Even the nine million refugees from the eastern territories who formed their own political party, the All-German Bloc (formerly the League of Refugees and Disenfranchised), and who repre-

sented a restive, dangerous element in the early years of the republic, have been almost completely absorbed by the big parties. The All-German Bloc (G.B.-B.H.E.), even after its merger with the German Party in 1961, failed to meet the five per cent requirement in the elections of that year.

ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Judging, then, from the development of political parties and institutions it would seem that democracy has gained firm roots in Western Germany. There is no reason to doubt the further development of political life in that direction even when the tremendous authority of Adenauer is someday removed from the scene.

But is Adenauer's Germany a true democracy? Is Adenauer himself a democratic statesman? The chancellor has often been charged, even by many C.D.U. party leaders, with using authoritarian methods to gain his ends. To a considerable extent this is true. The manner in which he outmaneuvered his rivals and suppressed opposition in the C.D.U., the one-man diplomacy first with the Allied High Commissioners, later with heads of foreign governments, the high-handed treatment of some of his cabinet ministers, all point to an authoritarian personality. However, this is a far cry from dictatorship and unconstitutional practices. There have been certain irregularities and perhaps even illegal procedures (which only the courts can prove) on the part of the government in connection with the *Spiegel* affair, and for these Adenauer must bear responsibility.

It must be noted, also, that with advancing years the Chancellor's mental and physical vigors have waned—his fantastic stamina notwithstanding—so that his control over things has been slipping. This state of affairs has naturally accelerated dissatisfaction and demands for his resignation. It is proof of his unique tenacity that he has been able to maintain himself in office so long.

Democratic institutions alone, of course, do not add up to democracy. It takes time to acquire democratic habits. But here, too, it can be demonstrated that energetic measures

⁹ Cf. Elmer Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 153.

have been taken over the years by the federal and local governments, by the parties and labor unions, by churches and youth organizations, and by the mass media to institute and promote education for democracy. Signs of possible recrudescence of anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism have produced vigorous reactions from official and unofficial quarters. It should be remembered in this connection that Adenauer himself has consistently taken the lead in promoting legislative measures to reconcile and compensate Jews (as far as this is possible) at home and abroad. A new central agency was established in Ludwigsburg in 1959 with the express task of ferreting out Nazi crimes committed in foreign countries and preparing briefs for prosecution of mass murderers still alive. This is maintained, not by the federal government, but by ministries of justice of the individual *Laender* (states).

All possible steps are being taken to educate the new German army, particularly the officer corps, in democracy and to insure democratic behavior. This is being carried out, in part, by such new institutions as the Bundeswehr School for Internal Leadership and the Bundestag Commissioner for the Armed Forces whose task is to protect the democratic rights of members of the armed forces. The avowed aim of the government is to build a genuine citizens' army, an army that will not again become a "state within the state." To be sure, in all this praiseworthy endeavor there are still shortcomings, there is still indifference, lethargy and inefficiency, but good intention is unmistakably there. The greatest miracle of the Adenauer era is, perhaps, that the overwhelming majority of Germans today identify themselves with the democratic institutions and policies of the Federal Republic. And this despite the fact that much of it was imposed or inspired by the Allied occupation authorities!

Now that the end of the long chancellorship is approaching, and with it the end of the Adenauer era, the question of the

succession is of paramount importance. It is a riddle that has puzzled many observers, for Adenauer has failed—probably deliberately—to groom a crown prince. His autocratic temperament, his ambition to get things done his own way, his reliance on his continuing vitality have prevented him from giving time and thought to the succession question. Instead he has concentrated all efforts on settling major foreign policy questions as long as he can. He fears that those coming after him will lack the experience and moral determination to commit Germany to the new European order that he envisions as the only salvation for its citizens.

Three years ago the succession problem came out in the open and produced a bewildering upheaval in Bonn politics. Theodor Heuss, the venerable Swabian, liberal politician and scholar, who served as the Federal Republic's first president with dignity and grace for two successive terms (thereby greatly contributing to the prestige of the republic) was due to retire. At this juncture, Adenauer announced that he would be a candidate for the presidency. At the same time he emphasized that this switch would not change German foreign policies by one iota and, in fact, intimated that as president he would continue to exert strong influence on foreign policy. What had happened was that restive C.D.U. leaders in the parliamentary "fraction" had persuaded him to utilize the occasion of Heuss' retirement for a smooth succession in the chancellorship. They apparently pointed out to him the possibility of exploiting the constitutional prerogatives of the presidency so that he could continue to control foreign policy.¹⁰

CHANCELLOR'S SUCCESSION

With considerable reluctance he accepted the proposition, hoping at the same time to place a man of his own choice into the chancellorship. The party's choice for this post was Erhard, the popular economics minister, chubby-faced, smiling and cigar-smoking, the living advertisement of his "economic miracle." But he was definitely not Adenauer's choice. The Chancellor had no

¹⁰ The whole episode is ably summarized in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960), p. 222ff.

confidence in Erhard's ability or intention to pursue the European path he had laid out. He publicly expressed doubts as to Erhard's qualifications for this office and instead pushed the candidacy of his trusted finance minister, Franz Etzel, who had, among other things, served with distinction with the European Coal and Steel Community. But the latter was scarcely known to the public, whereas the familiar figure of Erhard could be expected to bring in the votes in the 1961 elections. This was another case of the priority of foreign policy over domestic issues, a view which parliamentary party tacticians could not be expected to share.

But as the Erhard camp was already exulting in triumph over the succession, Adenauer suddenly threw a monkey wrench into their calculations by withdrawing his candidacy and announcing his resolve to continue as chancellor for an indefinite period. He pointed to the threatening international situation in the summer of that year (Berlin deadlock, Geneva conference stalemate, and the death of John Foster Dulles) which made a change of pilots undesirable. He further justified his reversal by calmly averring that he had come to the conclusion, after further study, that the constitutional powers of the presidency did not suffice to afford him sufficient control over foreign policy. This tergiversation from a statesman who had impressed the world with his granitic self-assurance came as a complete surprise and produced a storm of protests in party ranks. Once more he was able to weather the crisis with his indomitable authority: everyone bowed to the inevitable, including the hapless Erhard, who at the time was away on a tour abroad.

Today the augury for the succession is clearer. Since the election setback in 1961 which reduced the C.D.U.'s representation in the Bundestag from 270 to 242 seats, while that of the Socialists rose from 169 to 190, and most significantly, that of the Free Democrats from 41 to 67, Adenauer's power has eroded considerably. A precarious and mutually unsatisfactory coalition was worked out with the Free Democrats who, inebriated

with their balance-of-power position in the parliament, were in no mood to be modest. But the mere gesture of C.D.U. leaders to enter negotiations with the common enemy, the S.P.D., brought Erich Mende and his F.D.P. colleagues (who had stoutly vowed before the election not to enter a cabinet under Adenauer) to reason, and to accept five cabinet posts under Adenauer. One price of their support was the replacement of Foreign Minister Brentano (C.D.U.) with Gerhard Schroeder (C.D.U.) who was believed to be more flexible on the East-West issue.

One year later, as a result of the *Spiegel* affairs, Adenauer was forced to promise to retire by the fall of 1963. While it is now more than likely that Erhard will be his successor, he may possibly serve only an interim term until the next parliamentary elections in 1965. Erhard's prestige, too, has eroded with the years and with the declining economic boom. Considering his meek submission to his chief at various critical moments it is doubtful that Erhard will assert strong leadership. Yet he is still the most popular figure in the party, especially after the elimination of Strauss (at least for the time being) from the race. Whether younger men in Bonn, like Gerhard Schroeder or Von Hassel, or the new C.D.U. executive secretary, Josef Dufhues, will acquire sufficient stature to fill the immense void that will be created by the departure of Adenauer from the arena remains to be seen. In any event, C.D.U. leaders will have to be mindful of the fact that the opposition, the Social Democrats, possess in Willy Brandt, the youthful, plucky mayor of Berlin, a contender for the chancellorship who may well defeat a C.D.U. deprived of an Adenauer in the 1965 elections.

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In an appraisal of West German foreign policy, this specialist concludes that "On the whole, the successful pro-Western policy of the Adenauer era will probably be supplemented by a new Eastern policy in the post-Adenauer era. Such a policy, . . . most Germans would agree, must not change Germany's faithful adherence to the North Atlantic community, an adherence which made possible a German development much 'too promising and too precious' to allow it to be undermined either by de Gaulle's nationalist ambitions or by a mistaken German Eastern policy."

Germany in World Politics

By HANS KOHN

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GERMANY'S POSITION in world politics, like that of any other country, depends on the constellation of world forces and on the character of world conflicts, both of them not permanent but continually changing, often from decade to decade. Twenty-five years ago (1938) Germany faced on her western border a disunited and largely disarmed West, and on her eastern border a medley of small states, none of them nationally consolidated and all of them jealous and suspicious of each other. This constellation, which dated back to 1918—to the break-up of the Western alliance and of the Habsburg monarchy which had presented a barrier to Germany's expansion to the south-east—encouraged Germany to undertake her second attempt to establish her hegemony over Europe and her position as a leading world power.¹ This time the effort was made under much more propitious auspices.

¹ On Germany's goals in the war of 1914 see the book by the historian Ernst Fischer of Hamburg University, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielepolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Droste Verlag, Duesseldorf, 1961) based on entirely new German archival material. This is perhaps the most important publication on World War I that has appeared in many years.

By 1963, the world political constellation had completely changed. The West is highly armed and relatively united. On the eastern border, Germany faces an eastern Europe consolidated under, and protected by, Soviet Russian power. The strength of the Soviet Union, which no one could foresee in 1938, is the direct result of German aggressiveness, of the German *Drang nach Osten* in 1939 and 1941. The unity in the West, which was never achieved against German expansionism before 1914 or before 1938, is the direct result of Soviet Russia's aggressiveness manifested in Stalin's last years, from the Berlin blockade and the Prague coup to the Korean war.

Germany's fate after 1945 was determined not only by the new reality of world forces, represented by the towering strength of the United States and of Soviet Russia, but also by the character of the new world conflict. This conflict no longer centers around German and Japanese ambitions, as it did in the 1930's. It has been caused by Soviet Russian expansionism and its challenge to the situation in Europe and the Far East resulting from the common victory of the Anglo-Americans and of Soviet Russia. This constella-

tion of a rapidly growing world-wide conflict between "East" and "West" made inevitable a partition of Germany (which had threatened and attacked both West and East and had been defeated by their joint effort). Each of the victorious and now conflicting power systems tried to order "its" part of Germany according to its own image and interests. There was irony in the fact that National Socialist Germany which, with equal ferociousness and contempt, had rejected and fought democracy and communism, was now in its western part organized as a democratic and in its eastern part as a Communist state. Not only the two world political forces which emerged as a result of German aggressiveness but also their two opposing ideologies which Germany had combatted, faced each other across the new frontier established on German territory at the end of the war.

In this confrontation, Western democracy has proved its economic and political superiority. There is probably no other place on earth where this fact is so evident as in Germany. On both sides of the Elbe, the people are similar in tradition and education, in industriousness and in work discipline. Yet the German Federal Republic has become one of the most prosperous and advanced political entities of the 1950's and the early 1960's, whereas the German Democratic Republic, the Communist creation in the Soviet-occupied zone, has passed through a permanent and growing economic crisis. Western Germany, with the help of the United States, was not only able to provide the highest standard of living in German history but even to absorb more than nine million refugees and expellees. Eastern Germany, on the other hand, was weakened by the flight of millions of its citizens; in August, 1961, it had to build the wall across Berlin to prevent the disintegration of the Communist state. Perhaps nowhere else has American foreign

policy in the last 17 years, in spite of all inevitable minor errors, been so successful as in Germany. The partition of Germany for which German nationalists often erroneously blame Franklin D. Roosevelt was the outcome of a war which Germany confidently started and ruthlessly conducted. Yet the partition of Germany, as Golo Mann recently pointed out, has a positive aspect which has made possible and stimulated a very gratifying development in West European affairs.

Without the partition of Germany, Bonn could not have developed its highly constructive, steady, and confidence-inspiring policy toward the West, and without such a foreign policy West Germany's prosperity would not have been possible either. Without the partition of Germany, Franco-German reconciliation would not have been possible. It was achieved between Paris and Bonn, not between Paris and Berlin; between two partners of roughly equal strength, not between France and a Germany whose inhabitants would number half as many again and whose economic strength would be twice that of France.²

The Republic of Bonn has now lasted for about the same time as did the Republic of Weimar. But whereas the Republic of Weimar undermined its existence by the political passions and the anti-Western affects of a growing number of its citizens, the Republic of Bonn has shown an infinitely greater stability and has rightly inspired confidence in the West. The large majority of its citizens have devoted themselves to prosperity and no longer to political passions.

This change in the German international situation and national attitude, which no one could foresee in 1938, was not only due to American foreign policy but also to the fact that Western Germany found unexpectedly in Konrad Adenauer a great and constructive statesman. Of course, he has personal and ideological limitations. He is as little like Gladstone as Bismarck was like Disraeli. In his will to power, purposefulness and solitary authoritarianism Adenauer can be compared to Bismarck, but the Catholic Rheinlander does not share the Prussian Junker's passionate anti-democratic and anti-Western convictions.

² Golo Mann, "Rapallo: the Vanishing Dream," *Survey*, a Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, London, October 1962, pp. 74-88. Golo Mann, son of Thomas Mann, is professor of political science at the Institute of Technology in Stuttgart.

Bismarck succeeded in alienating Germany from the dominant Western trend of liberal democracy; Adenauer's achievement was greater and more unexpected. He succeeded in reversing this anti-Westernism which had grown in the Weimar Reich and had reached its climax under Hitler. Bismarck's triumph brought in its consequences great misfortune to Germany and to Europe. The Reich he created was short-lived. It collapsed partly in 1918 and definitely in 1945. The future may show that Adenauer built stronger and healthier foundations, which will help to inaugurate an era of lasting good will and peaceful cooperation for Western Europe.³

For 13 years Adenauer has been identified with the consolidation, against great initial odds, of the German Federal Republic. When he was elected Chancellor on September 15, 1949, a man in his middle seventies, the future of the new state and of Adenauer's chancellorship seemed most uncertain. Both were accepted by German public opinion as temporary expedients. Yet the old man, who was then about the same age as Bismarck was at the time of his enforced retirement, was able by his personal strength

to consolidate the new state. The democratic and free federal elections of 1953 and 1957 were votes of confidence in his authoritarian leadership.

Now, in 1963, the Adenauer era is coming to its end, and this under circumstances tragic for the Grand Old Man himself. Unfortunately, at the height of his prestige and power, in April, 1959, he lacked the moral strength to leave the chancellorship for the quiet dignity of the federal presidency. It was then high time for him to withdraw, his great work accomplished. But he had no confidence in his own work; he did not believe that the German Federal Republic could continue its stability and its pro-Western orientation without him; that it could live because of its own strength. Adenauer thought himself indispensable and underestimated the democratic tide in German public opinion. The elections of 1961 no longer gave him a majority.

From that time on Adenauer's administration was in permanent crisis, which reached a climax in the mismanagement of the Spiegel Affair of October 27, 1962. Through the fault of the government the affair turned into a political scandal and used up the Chancellor's prestige, even in his own party.⁴

A few years ago Adenauer in his person represented the fountainhead and the strength of an awakening German democracy. Now his agreed-upon resignation in October, 1963, will give new vitality to German democracy which has shown its strength in the Spiegel Affair. The coalition of the Chancellor's party with the Free Democrats (which has governed Germany since 1961 and was reformed at the end of 1962 after most embarrassing negotiations) is no longer a stable government. It is as much a "lame duck" as the Chancellor himself. The one promising sign of the negotiations at the end of 1962 was the attempt to form a coalition between the Christian Democrats, the Chancellor's party, and Germany's second strongest party, the Social Democrats, whom the Chancellor had always kept out of the government and whom he had declared untrustworthy in national and international politics.

³ On Bismarck's role see my *The Mind of Germany* (New York: Scribner's, 1960), now in its third printing, and Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany. The Period of Unification 1815-1871* (Princeton University Press, 1963). Professor Pflanze writes: "During the last two centuries a cultural cleavage opened along the Rhine. In the development of her political attitudes and institutions Germany followed a course largely independent of the West. . . . Because of Bismarck the gap widened still more. He compounded a new synthesis in German political attitudes between German nationalism, Prussian militarism, and Hohenzollern authoritarianism" (p. 8 f). Adenauer tried to bridge this cleavage along the Rhine. He succeeded in narrowing the gap considerably. He was helped by the fortunate fact that Prussia and the Hohenzollerns had definitely disappeared from the German scene. Bismarck wore the uniform of a Prussian Major-General as his normal dress and in a Christmas letter in 1872 he regretted that it had been his lot to serve the royal house as an official rather than as an officer. Such an attitude would be unthinkable in Adenauer's case.

⁴ See the excellent article by Fritz René Allemann, *Hybris und Zerfall. Die Tragödie Konrad Adenauers, Der Monat*, Berlin, January, 1963, and the editorial *Uebergangsregierung in Bonn, Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 16, 1962. Both the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and *Der Monat* have in the past strongly supported Adenauer's general line.

Though Federal President Luebke favored such a "great coalition," it was not realized this time. Yet a coalition between Catholic Conservatives and Social Democrats has now existed successfully for 17 years in Austria. Adenauer's resignation will make such a coalition possible in Germany too; thus the conservative immobility which characterized the last years of his government will be broken. This will mean a further strengthening of democracy in the German Federal Republic corresponding, to a certain degree, to the "opening to the Left" which was accomplished recently in Italy under Christian Democratic auspices.

"The attempt to solve the crisis by taking the Social Democrats into the government would undoubtedly have been the cleanest and most effective way to overcome the crisis of confidence in the Federal Republic," the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* wrote. This is the best-informed newspaper in the German language, which has never shown great sympathy for the Social Democratic party or its policies.

Co-responsibility on the part of the opposition would have been a guarantee for full clarity in the Spiegel Affair and against a repetition of the abuses that led to the crisis. . . . The idea of the Social Democrats' inclusion in the government has, thanks to the brief episode of coalition talks between Adenauer and Ollenhauer, grown stronger roots, and has also won the recognition, in principle, of the Christian Democratic Union. That, in any event, is an important milestone in the political development of the German Federal Republic.⁵

II

The end of the Adenauer era will bring a new mobility to German domestic policy. Germany's position in world politics, too, will experience new vigor. The process will create a new and better atmosphere between the government and a large part of the younger generation which has looked upon the official

policy as ossified. The stability of the democratic German Federal Republic will be strengthened.

Democratic German youth viewed the Adenauer regime in the last years with a feeling of growing opposition which in its bitterness tended to overlook Adenauer's great achievements in building a more secure basis for German democracy than the Wilhelminian or the Weimar Reich ever knew. This youth lacks the historical perspective to evaluate Adenauer's great merits; it has not experienced the Berlin-centered Reich with its feeling of superiority over the Slavs. The younger generation is eager to change the imperialist heritage and to deepen the democratic regeneration of Germany. One finds among young Germans

a growing realization of the need to make amends to the Poles for the treatment they suffered from the Nazis. . . . Anybody who remembers the nationalist rantings [against Poles and Slavs, above all against Poles and the frontiers of 1930] of even moderate Germans at the time of the Weimar Republic, must be truly amazed by the tremendous amount of goodwill, at least toward Poland, that is manifested in Germany today. . . . To most people of the young generation, Breslau and Königsberg, Danzig and Stettin, appear to be far-away cities irretrievably lost.⁶

Adenauer's policy towards the West has been successful and beneficial for Germany. Germany's Eastern European policy, on the other hand, has been characterized by immobility and sterility. The general world-political context of 1963 favors laying the foundations for a more constructive program in Germany's eastern policy.

There are still many Germans, especially among the older generation, who pursue territorial aims. They officially demand the restoration of the frontiers of 1937 by "peaceful" means. They forget that even liberal and democratic Germans thought the eastern frontiers of Germany as they existed between 1920 and 1937 "unbearable." Some Germans go therefore even further today; they hope for the restoration of the frontiers of 1938 (which would include Austria and the Sudetenland) or those of 1914, which Germany had not accepted then and which it

⁵ From the above mentioned editorial in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of December 16, 1962, translated in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, a monthly publication of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January, 1963.

⁶ F. R. Allemann, "Adenauer's Eastern Policy," *Survey*, *op. cit.*, p. 35 f. See there also the article by Walter Laqueur, "Russia and Germany."

tried to rectify by annexations to the west and east in World War I. But, as Golo Mann wrote as far back as 1950,

it is not possible to return to the past, to restore what has been destroyed; impossible to retrieve what was recklessly lost. Germany today can only have functional political aims—economic, moral, practical aims.⁷

Adenauer's Germany pursued practical aims in the West, until the romantic and reactionary *fata morgana* of a Western Europe dominated by a Paris-Bonn axis attracted Adenauer after de Gaulle's "democratic" authoritarianism appeared to have established a "strong" France under a "strong" man. But aside from Adenauer, West German leadership of all parties, including Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer's probable successor, and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, is opposed to de Gaulle's anti-British and anti-American policy. West Germans know the instability of the present French authoritarian

regime which depends on the life and strength of its one great man. They understand that the still delicate plant of German democracy cannot grow strong by relying on an unstable and vacillating French democracy but needs that close cooperation with Britain and the United States in a North Atlantic Community which de Gaulle so haughtily rejects. Few factors present as great a threat to the consolidation of German democracy as the hope of domination of Western Europe by a Paris-Bonn axis under authoritarian leadership in opposition to Anglo-American democracy. Such an axis recalls international constellations from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries under which continental authoritarianism in the name of Europe and its civilization underestimated and proudly fought the maritime commercial powers.⁸

On the whole, the successful pro-Western policy of the Adenauer era will probably be supplemented by a new Eastern policy in the post-Adenauer era. Such a policy, Golo Mann warns, and most Germans would agree, must not change Germany's faithful adherence to the North Atlantic community, an adherence which made possible a German development much "too promising and too precious" to allow it to be undermined either by de Gaulle's traditional nationalist ambitions or by a mistaken German Eastern policy.

The actual content of a new Eastern policy cannot be outlined today. Its premise is a change of fundamental attitude on the part of the official circles of the German Federal Republic. Golo Mann sums up the general terms of the possible policy as the recognition of communism as an enduring opponent with whom one will have to live if one does not want to die with him; a relaxation of tension and an understanding as far as the opponent wants it, for an understanding is inevitably a two-way affair; the recognition of the Polish Oder-Neisse frontier and of the fact that Eastern Germany lies within the Russian sphere as long as the cold war goes on; and finally concentration on the immediate aim of making conditions in Eastern Germany, in the German Democratic Republic, more tol-

⁷ This quest for "just" Eastern frontiers was one of the most potent forces that brought German nationalism to feverish heat in the Weimar Reich. Thomas Mann wrote on June 6, 1932, in a letter, that nationalism was "today no more than an ugly mass passion, a barrier to world progress and a blight to our lives." He quoted Goethe as writing in 1798 that "patriotism conceived as personal bravery has outlived itself just as much as clericalism and aristocratism." Mann complained that the Germans aspired in 1932 to "restoration. Their eyes are turned backwards to a past which cannot help them; and one is filled with horror at the defeats which await them and which, it goes without saying, will involve disastrous internal struggles." There is little of such a nationalism among the majority of young Germans, but a similar nostalgic backward looking nationalism under de Gaulle's leadership in neighboring France harbors a danger for German democracy, too.

⁸ See the important editorial by James Reston, "What people do they think we are?" in *The New York Times*. Western edition, January 21, 1963, and the last paragraph in the editorial of "Sirius" (Hubert Beuve-Méry) in *Le Monde*, weekly edition, Paris, January 10-16, 1963, which reads: "Ce qui est sûr, c'est que des affirmations de nationalisme exacerbé ne peuvent qu'engendrer le désordre et mener à l'isolement. Le général de Gaulle se complait à ces jeux, qui effraient ou irritent ses partenaires et ne pouvant que réjouir l'adversaire. Tantôt prince de l'équivoque et tantôt risquant une mise énorme sur quelque coup de poker, il tend à imposer sa loi aux Européens et aux Américains de même qu'il a su l'imposer aux Français. Puisse-t-il ne pas avoir, comme en Algérie, à s'incliner trop tard et à trop haut prix devant les réalités qu'il se flattait de maîtriser!"

erable, more lawful and more free for the seventeen million Germans living there.⁹

III

Such a change of Germany's Eastern policy in the post-Adenauer era will be facilitated by the changed world political situation in 1963. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Russian missiles in Cuba has revealed both United States nuclear superiority and Khrushchev's and the Russian people's reluctance to wage a nuclear war. Today the United States possesses, according to Hanson W. Baldwin,

the strongest military force in the world. . . . The chief elements of this superiority are a powerful and increasingly invulnerable nuclear delivery capability, many times greater than Russia's, and with sufficient power to destroy the USSR as a military or political entity, and a Navy greatly superior to Russia in over-all strength.

The new budget proposed by President Kennedy in January, 1963, will

lengthen the United States lead over Soviet Russia in numbers of inter-continental missiles, both land-based and sea-based. In fact, this lead now appears to be so great that there is no immediate prospect that Russia can overtake it numerically.¹⁰

The new attitude of Khrushchev in favor of "peaceful co-existence," an attitude apparently shared by the peoples in the U.S.S.R. and in the European satellites, found its expression in his rapprochement with Yugoslavia, in the growing rift with China and in the speeches at the Sixth Congress of the

Communist party of the German Democratic Republic held in East Berlin in mid-January, 1963. The representatives of Yugoslavia who participated for the first time at a party congress in the satellite countries were warmly welcomed. A very different reception was given to the Chinese delegate, Wu Hsiuchuan, who bitterly attacked the Yugoslavs—thereby meaning Khrushchev—as "usurpers of the title of Communists" who had "surrendered to the imperialists." Khrushchev came in person to the East Berlin Congress but not to renew his ultimative demand about West Berlin delivered more than four years ago, in November, 1958. His speech was, naturally within the ritual framework for Communist incantations, surprisingly void of threats and aggressiveness. "Premier Khrushchev's speech in Berlin today," Max Frankel reported from Washington on January 16,

was regarded here as milder toward the Western powers . . . than anyone has expected it to be. Administration analysts read the Soviet Premier's address as notice that the Berlin crisis was over for the foreseeable future. They had felt it to be so but had not dared to anticipate a candid admission of the collapse of the major Soviet diplomatic drive.¹¹

The confrontation over the missiles in Cuba and the firmness of the Kennedy administration over West Berlin have, at least for several years, turned back the Soviet offensive against West Berlin in the same way as the Anglo-American airlift did 15 years ago. West Berlin's inhabitants have on both occasions remained determined to continue their democratic freedom. In addition, West Berlin is being developed with the help of the Ford Foundation into one of the leading intellectual and artistic centers of the demo-

(Continued on page 243)

⁹ See Golo Mann, *Survey*, *op. cit.*, pp. 87f. See also Gerald Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961) p. 253. On the change in Western Germany regarding a more active Eastern policy see Klaus-Peter Schulz, "Grenze von Gestern, Brücke von Morgen. Gedanken über die Aussichten einer deutsche-polnischen Verständigung," (The Frontier of Yesterday, the Bridge of Tomorrow. Thoughts about the Prospects of a German-Polish Understanding), *Der Monat*, Berlin, January 1963, pp. 42-54, and the articles of Rolf Schroers, Harmut von Hentig, and Margret Boveri in *Merkur*, Munich, April and October, 1962.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, Western edition, January 19, 1963.

¹¹ *The New York Times*, Western edition, January 17, 1963, p. 1.

Hans Kohn is professor of history emeritus of the City University of New York. His book, *The Mind of Germany* (1960), is now in its third printing; a German translation appeared in 1962 and Italian and Dutch translations will appear in 1963. His latest book is *The Age of Nationalism, The First Era of Global History* (1962).

Discussing the "growing German interest in East Europe," this specialist notes that "the idea of making a new clean start in Eastern Europe has been gaining momentum, especially among the youth."

West Germany and East Europe

By M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI
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THE EASTERN policy of the German Federal Republic, like almost any other important aspect of its national life, has been overshadowed by the views and personality of Dr. Konrad Adenauer. His outlook in this respect has been determined by three over-riding considerations: first, his abiding loyalty to the Western alliance and his conviction of the compelling need for a far-reaching integration of Germany with Western Europe; second, his rejection of the puppet East German Communist regime, as representing a ridiculous and provocative legal fiction petrifying Germany's partition and symbolizing subservience to a godless and barbarous system of government, alien to everything, in his opinion, that Christian and democratic Germany should represent. (Hence his order of priorities: first, Western integration, then reunification following and resulting from the integration.) The third obstacle to a more flexible *Ostpolitik*, advocated by many of Adenauer's opponents and even by some of his collaborators, has been the "Hallstein doctrine," which forbids Bonn to maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognizes the "German Democratic Republic." The line of policy determined by these three considerations resulted in a far-reaching coordination of West Germany with Nato while deepening the split with East Germany and postponing unification.

Immediately the question arises: was there any alternative to this course? Adenauer be-

came Chancellor of the Federal Republic in September, 1949. In March, 1952, Stalin sent to Bonn a note suggesting reunification of Germany followed by its neutralization. This was, perhaps, a fair chance for Germany to reestablish national unity: at that time neither her merger with the West nor East Germany's Sovietization were yet too far advanced. On the other hand, the economic recovery of the Federal Republic, "the economic miracle" of Dr. Ludwig Erhard, was well under way, and its attraction was sufficient to affect the Soviet occupation zone, then being transformed into the German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.).

Of course, Stalin hoped that such a neutral Germany would eventually turn Communist. But was he right? From Milovan Djilas' conversations with the Soviet dictator we know that he was mistaken in his evaluation of the long term socio-economic consequences of the war. Stalin was convinced that, as a result of the war, the German middle class was ruined forever. The phenomenal recovery of the German "Buergerstand" has made the Federal Republic one of the most bourgeois states in the world. Native German communism, relying on Soviet bayonets more heavily than any other satellite regime, on the other hand, has been so weak that one may safely assume that the Kremlin's hopes of Sovietizing a united but neutralized Germany would have been frustrated. There is no doubt that the acceptance of Stalin's bid in-

volved an element of risk. But statesmanship can never be disassociated from risks.

Thus it seems that, as early as 1952, Bonn lost a fair chance of achieving reunification at the price of neutralization. Both determination to achieve integration with the West and the reluctance to accept the East German puppet even indirectly in some sort of confederation played an equal role in this decision.

If West Germany's refusal [writes an American expert on German affairs] to recognize the DDR as anything more than a legal fiction has rendered illusory Bonn's search for positive initiatives toward East Europe and the Soviet Union, then the rigidity of Bonn's position must also be recognized as the inexorable corollary of a larger official illusion. Postulating national reunification as a necessary and feasible goal of its foreign policy, Bonn has held that resoluteness and firmness within an increasingly powerful Western alliance would produce the desired Soviet concessions—up to and including the retirement of Soviet power from Central Europe—and thus accomplish the reunification of Germany “in freedom.”¹

FEAR OF UNITED GERMANY

So far, the course of events has not justified these hopes. The Western powers, paying lip service to the idea of reunification, are actually rather afraid of the spectre of 70 million Germans again sprawling in the heart of Europe. This is especially true of the British and French people. The merger of West Germany with Western Europe has been possible largely because Germany is divided. On the other hand, from the Soviet point of view, the problem of German unification, as understood by Bonn, is dead. Soviet fear of a united but not Communist Germany became an obsession. Moreover, the Kremlin has become too committed to its puppet regime at Pankow; and East Germany has become too much an integral segment of the Soviet bloc, of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact.

The Berlin wall is an outward symbol of this seemingly irrevocable commitment. East Germany, besides being an advanced military

outpost of the Soviet Union, is also its valuable trading partner and an important instrument of the Communist offensive in the underdeveloped countries. It is obvious that by now Moscow would agree to unification only on terms of its own choosing.

In January, 1963, speaking to a group of West Berliners who met him in East Berlin at the East German Communist party congress, Khrushchev declared with disarming frankness that he would favor all-German elections on reunification “if 50,000,000 people lived in East Germany and 17,000,000 in West Germany. We know our arithmetics.” Then he let it be understood that he knows which way the majority of them would turn if left to themselves. As far back as 1956, Khrushchev candidly stated to a high-ranking French delegation: “I prefer the known reality of 17 million Germans living under Communism to the unknown consequences that may follow the setting up of a neutral Germany with 70 million people.”

Consequently it appears that on both sides room for maneuvering has become rather restricted. Today both main antagonists in the world conflict are committed to their respective German republics. Washington would not agree to neutralize a united Germany, because Nato would lose the strongest segment of its alliance in Europe. Consequently, since neither side can afford to capitulate and both are afraid to strike a bold bargain in the shape of some sort of disengagement, or a “Rapacki Plan” in a modified form, the maintenance of the *status quo* seems to be the best bet, until the German problem can be fitted into some broad international settlement involving both camps.

Thus the policy of wait and see and explore seems to be the order of the day not only in Washington but also in Bonn, where the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gerhard Schroeder, would like to find a possible alternative to the rather rigid present course. He has set up a “brain trust” of East European experts to re-study the entire “Ostpolitik.” The New Year speech of the Chancellor also forecast a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

¹ M. Croanen, “Soviet German Relations,” *Survey*, London, October, 1962.

GERMAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT?

There is, theoretically, another chance for German reunification: a new German-Soviet rapprochement, if not alliance. There are still many people in Germany who think in traditional terms, people who nostalgically remember Taurogen, Bismarck and Rapallo. The old school conservatives are among them; there are some wishy-washy Social Democrats, adventurous businessmen and maybe even some members of Adenauer's cabinet, who are secretly reminiscent about the good old Bismarckian days. The incentives that stimulate such daydreaming are obvious: aversion to war; the knowledge that the Russians might offer some important concessions, return at least some of the Oder-Neisse lands, or open Russian markets to German economic penetration. Here one should say that as long as Adenauer is at the helm, i.e., at least until October, 1963, a deal with Moscow is out of question. Adenauer has been so deeply committed to the idea of Western integration, so fiercely opposed to any idea of an alliance, or even cooperation, with Russia that there is no real fear of such a deal.

But what about Adenauer's departure? Of course, nobody at this point can foresee who will succeed him, what policy he will pursue, or what consequences President Charles de Gaulle's policy may have for the unity of Nato and the Western world. Assuming, however, that Nato will survive the crisis, it would be difficult to imagine the Germans negotiating with Moscow without the approval of Washington. Besides this, the Germans know that outside Nato their bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union would be considerably weakened. After all, it is their alliance with the West which gives them bargaining power.

One has to bear in mind that the rising military power of West Germany within Nato was a factor in Russian insistence on the recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state and the attempts to force the Allies to withdraw their troops from Berlin. Thus, German leaders could only participate in the negotiations with Moscow, they could not successfully lead them single-handedly. The

strategic situation in the world is in no way like that of 1939 when Hitler and Stalin struck their deal.

The Russian demand that West Berlin be absorbed by East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht or made a free city can be resisted only by the united forces of the West. The Federal Republic is bound by its own inclinations, as well as by the limitations of its strength, to the decisions of its Western partners.

This consideration is reinforced by a psychological factor: the memories of the past. The people of West Germany have had a disastrous experience with the *Ostpolitik* of Hitler. There is no responsible official in the Federal Republic, or among the responsible intellectuals of the new Germany, who has not had to concern himself with the terrible events of the recent past and the reasons for them. Even if direct negotiations were possible, even if the Russians were able to make concessions at the expense of the Poles or the Czechs without shattering their East European empire, even then a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union would be extremely difficult.

RELATIONS WITH THE SATELLITES

This much about Bonn's position and prospects as far as Russia is concerned. But what about the remaining members of the Soviet bloc: the satellite countries of East Europe, especially the immediate neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Poland? Here any student of Bonn's European policy is impressed by the difference between the attitude toward the Soviet Union and toward its satellities.

In 1955, Adenauer, breaking the Hallstein doctrine, decided to take a bold step and establish diplomatic relations with the Kremlin. By this means he hoped to be able to circumvent the puppet Pankow regime, and deal directly with its Soviet masters. On the other hand, no diplomatic relations have been opened with the Soviet satellities. But of all the Great Expectations that were allegedly to follow the decision of sending an ambassador to Moscow, practically all have faded away. This happened despite the almost

cordial personal ties between Hans Kroll and Khrushchev. A certain momentary relaxation of tension, the repatriation of about 10,000 German POW's and nearly 50,000 civilians from the Soviet Union, plus a considerable expansion of economic relations, resulted from the opening of a "direct line" with the Kremlin.² But all the hopes that Khrushchev might sacrifice Ulbricht and allow the two German states to merge on conditions acceptable to Bonn, evaporated quickly and completely. Thus the establishment of diplomatic relations does not necessarily help to solve problems.

Discussing the policy of Bonn toward the satellite states of East Central Europe, a prominent West German publicist, editor of the influential Berlin magazine *Der Monat*, thus summarizes the attitude of the Federal Republic:

Ever since 1945, the countries of the Eastern bloc, with the exception of Russia and East Germany, have been nearly as far out of the reach of any West German political endeavor as if they were situated somewhere in the heart of Central Asia.³

The author, F. R. Allemann, an advocate of the establishment of diplomatic relations with at least some of the satellite regimes, including Poland, believes that the policy of ignoring this vital area has been detrimental to the interests of Germany as a whole. According to him the first major application of the Hallstein doctrine, the breaking of relations with Yugoslavia, took place in 1957, i.e.,


exactly at the moment when the "Polish October," so critically viewed by the Pankow regime, seemed to create for Bonn a promising opportunity for an active and imaginative re-engagement in the affairs of Eastern Europe. An early recognition of the Gomulka regime would have strengthened the centrifugal revisionist tendencies within the Soviet bloc and weakened the Ulbricht regime, or at least compelled it to grant some concessions similar to those the Poles had wrested for themselves, thus making the lot of 17 million Germans more tolerable. After all, the petrification of the rigidly Stalinist regime in East Germany is not, in the long run, in the interest of Bonn.

One may, of course, argue against this school of thought. Moreover, one should not attach too much importance to the establishment of diplomatic ties between Bonn and the Communist countries of East Europe. In the present rigid framework of international relations the exchange of diplomatic representatives may bring little essential change. How little the existence of diplomatic representatives alters relations between two countries belonging to antagonistic alliances may be seen from eight years of German-Soviet diplomatic rapport.

In the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the establishment of diplomatic relations has been prevented by serious problems that need to be settled before such a step could be taken by Bonn, or agreed to by Warsaw or Prague. In the case of Rumania, Hungary or Bulgaria, these problems are not of a serious nature. But in the case of Czechoslovakia, and especially Poland, they are. Since 1945 over 12 million refugees from Eastern Europe, most of them from Poland and Czechoslovakia, have been resettled in the Federal Republic. They have formed several vociferous organizations clamoring for the return of the Oder-Neisse, former East Prussia, and to a lesser extent, of the Sudetenland to Germany. This powerful pressure group is a serious obstacle to the resumption of diplomatic intercourse with the countries of Eastern Europe, because both Poland and Czechoslovakia refuse to entertain any such idea without West Germany's recognizing the territorial *status quo*.

² During the period 1956-1962 commerce between West Germany and the countries of the Soviet bloc has been steadily increasing and the balance has been to the Germans' advantage. The total turnover in trade between the Federal Republic and the Soviet bloc rose from 1959 to 1962 by more than 60 per cent; since 1960 it has exceeded 4 billion German Marks, or \$1 billion, even excluding West Berlin which, on Soviet insistence, has not been covered by the Soviet-West German economic agreement that entered into force on December 31, 1960. Thus, up to the present the Common Market did not affect negatively commercial relations between the Federal Republic and the countries of Comecon; but should the consolidation of the Market proceed uninterrupted, the economic relations with the Soviet bloc may be hampered in the long run.

³ F. R. Allemann, "Adenauer's Eastern Policy," *Survey*, October, 1962.



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And this Bonn has not been able or willing to do, among other reasons because of the veto of the refugee organizations. This has resulted in the isolation of the Federal Republic from East Central Europe.

As in the case of Bonn and Moscow, so in the case of the relations between the Federal Republic and Russia's satellites, nothing drastic could be done immediately. But even without decisively breaking the existing deadlock some preparatory move might have been made in order to lay down the foundation for a slow and often painful transformation which has been taking place in German public opinion. The huge, but steadily dwindling group of refugees will gradually lose its influence on Bonn's policy. F. R. Allemann thus summarized the changes going on in the Federal Republic:

The inclination towards accepting the present frontiers of Germany (if not those in Germany) as a basis for any future settlement seems even more marked today than in the late fifties. To

most people of the young generation, Breslau and Königsberg, Danzig and Stettin, appear to be far-away cities irretrievably lost. Of course, the pressure of the *Landmannschaften* or the *Bund vertriebener Deutscher* (Union of Expelled Germans) to keep up the claim for their restoration to Germany—irrespective of whether this is considered feasible or not—still intimidates the government as well as all parties. But its effect on the population at large is no longer what it was.

It is most interesting (and encouraging) to study the impact made by a document like the memorandum drawn up by eight prominent lay members of the Evangelical Church, which accused the government of "not telling the truth" to the people about the chances (or lack of them) of ever recovering the lost provinces. In spite of the furious attacks on its authors by the refugee groups and their official spokesmen it has made an astonishingly deep impression on an important section of public opinion. . . . To more and more Germans, indeed, territorial revisionism of any kind (as distinct from self-determination for the Germans in the Soviet zone) appears increasingly futile, and the notion of opposing the eastern peace treaty campaign by a set

of proposals embodying, among other things, the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line, seems to be gaining ground rapidly—even though not a single political group has openly espoused the idea.

Interestingly enough his observations tally with the opinion expressed soon afterwards by a leading Polish Catholic publicist, Stefan Kisielewski, after his return from a visit to the Federal Republic. They also agree with the observations of the present writer derived from his two trips to Germany in 1955 and 1960. In his articles on West Germany, Kisielewski pointed out that in no other coun-

try of the Western world has there been so much fascination with East European affairs, especially art and literature. The increasing interest in East European literature is reflected in the growing number of translations from all East European languages into German. By 1961, these translations reached 160 titles, i.e., about seven per cent of all foreign languages. Russian literature leads with 97 titles; Czech is second with 18 titles; while Polish is third with 13.⁴

It is symptomatic that the German young people enthusiastically applauded not only the Soviet musician of Jewish extraction, David Oistrach, but also the Russian poet, Evgenii Jevtushenko, who last January made a *via triumphalis* through the Federal Republic, everywhere reciting his already famous poem "Babij Jar" condemning anti-Semitism.

But this growing German interest in East Europe is not limited to the literary and artistic world. The idea of making a new, clean start in Eastern Europe has been gaining ground, especially among the youth:

To a certain extent [continues Allemann] this reflects the unexpected but apparently sincere feeling that frontiers no longer matter very much—a feeling engendered by the tendency toward a united Western Europe. . . .

The German publicist concludes his article by saying that "no appraisal of Germany's policy toward Eastern Europe can overlook this slow and sometimes painful process of re-orientation from below which is going on under the deceptive cover of official lethargy."⁵

(Continued on page 243)

⁴ On the other hand, during 1961 over 600 West German titles were translated into Russian, nearly 160 into Czech and over 100 into Polish. The UNESCO reports show that between 1959 and 1962 the number of translations from the German into East European languages has been growing steadily. The growth rate varies between 9.8 per cent for Russian and 6 per cent as far as Hungarian and Rumanian languages are concerned. On May 30, 1959, the Soviet Union concluded a two year "agreement about culture and technoscientific exchange." It contained certain rules of procedure, similar to the American-Soviet agreements, and a concrete program for the exchange of artists, students, scholars, athletes, of cultural delegations as well as groups of experts from industry and agriculture, the showing of exhibitions as well as the exchange of films, tape recordings and documentary material. This extensive program was not carried out in full by the end of 1960. When negotiations about a new cultural agreement started in spring, 1961, a considerable number of schemes for cultural exchanges were still open. While both sides were interested in the conclusion of a new agreement, negotiations were suspended in May, 1961, because the Soviet delegation refused, as in the case of the economic agreement, the request of the German delegation to include inhabitants of Berlin in the cultural agreement. The Soviet delegation insisted on separate treatment of West Berlin. Both sides have since merely been clearing out the exchange left over from and planned within the framework of the old agreement. Cultural exchange between West Germany and the satellites is largely privately sponsored since there are no official agreements.

⁵ On September 7, 1962, the Hamburg paper, *Die Zeit*, published an article by Professor Golo Mann who expressed the opinion that the Poles are historically justified in their mistrust of the Germans. Hence any rapprochement between these two countries should be preceded by an act of good will on the part of Germany. It is necessary, wrote Professor Mann, to "accept voluntarily the new territorial *status quo* in East Europe. It should not be a result of peace negotiations, but a free manifestation of our will, carried out before the opening of the real peace negotiations." It is symptomatic that such a statement these days could be made publicly by a respectable and responsible man; in the atmosphere of the Weimar Republic this would have been unthinkable.

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"Whatever view one may hold of German foreign policy, there is little doubt that it has succeeded in one of its basic objectives, namely to become an integral part of the Western coalition. With its economic strength and growing military power it is probably safe to characterize Germany as the strongest continental power in Nato, although this status could be altered when France obtains an operational nuclear capability."

West German Policy in West Europe

By ALLAN S. NANES

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AT the end of the second World War Germany lay in ruins, her economy shattered and her power destroyed. It may be no exaggeration to state that perhaps she was the most cordially detested nation in history.*

Today, almost two decades later, the Federal Republic of Germany is a pillar of the West. Her economic recovery, the *wirtschaftswunder*, has been spectacular, and it has been accompanied by an almost equally miraculous restoration of her political credit. But while the economic miracle has been largely her own handiwork, her return to political respectability has been immeasurably assisted by the advent of the cold war. It is that struggle which has converted West Germany from a conquered province to a sought-after ally. For that conflict involves a confrontation of the major democratic countries, the so-called "free world," and the Communist world, in virtually every field of endeavor, with the possibility of armed conflict always present in the background. Under these conditions Germany represents an increment of power which cannot be ignored. Both East and West have thus proceeded to in-

corporate "their" segments of Germany (that they occupied) into their respective alliance systems, restoring Germany's sovereignty and prestige, at least in West Germany, in the process.

At the same time those nations which were Germany's enemies during the war, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, cannot forget the Nazi nightmare. Fear of German power and intention has not been entirely eradicated in eastern Europe or even among Bonn's allies. It is this ambivalence which has set the metes and bounds to West Germany's foreign policy. In order to restore and then maintain her independence and her influence, and to mitigate the fears aroused by her resurgence, West Germany has pursued the policy of the good European.

That policy was summarized by Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the *Bundestag*, as follows: "The primary goal of Germany today is to be a part of the North Atlantic alliance and a part of the united Europe."¹ Pursuant to that goal, West Germany has raised nine divisions, all committed to Nato, and has become a founding member of the European community, comprised of the Common Market, Euratom, and the Coal and Steel Community. Recent reports indicate that Germany will increase her 1963 defense budget,

* The views of the author are his own and do not represent those of the Library of Congress.

¹ In an interview in Israel. See *The New York Times*, November 26, 1962, p. 13.

thereby increasing her contribution to Nato.²

There seems little reason to doubt Germany's sincerity in its role as the good European. However, one of the principal reasons for the adoption of this policy was the belief that only by helping to create a Western position of strength could the Federal Republic hope to bring about reunification with its eastern counterpart. This argument was reiterated repeatedly by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the chief architect of the policy. It was questioned originally by the Social Democrats, the principal opposition, who favored a neutral, disarmed Germany if that were necessary to reunification. After several electoral defeats, the Social Democrats reversed themselves, and have gone along with the main outlines of the Chancellor's policy.

Ironically, the Social Democrats reversed themselves just at the time when it was becoming clear that some of their misgivings were justified. It seems apparent, for the present at least, that chances for German reunification on terms acceptable to the West, are infinitesimal. This failure has not prompted any reorientation in Bonn's policy *vis à vis* the Eastern bloc, however, nor does it seem likely to do so. Indeed, Bonn's passivity on the subject of reunification leads many observers to conclude that its interest in the subject is secondary. But there are those within Germany who are ardent for reunification, and would like to see the government pursue a more independent foreign policy toward the attainment of that goal.

AMERICAN-GERMAN UNITY

Bonn's desire to be a fully accepted member of the Western coalition has dovetailed closely with the aims of American policy. It was the United States which first urged German rearmament to reluctant allies. The United States has steadily supported European economic integration. American-German cooperation waxed, as the Chancellor and Secretary John Foster Dulles found

themselves in sympathetic agreement on the need for unrelenting firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union. In fact, it seemed at times as if Germany were the favored child, to the not-always-concealed annoyance of our allies.

Therefore it came as something of a surprise to Washington when Konrad Adenauer yielded to the importunings of Charles de Gaulle, and made common cause with France. Under ordinary circumstances this should be cause for satisfaction rather than concern, for Franco-German *rapprochement* ought to be a source of strength to the Western alliance.

The fact remains, however, that the United States and France are at serious odds with respect to the broad policies to be pursued by the alliance. De Gaulle is distrustful of American leadership, and is determined that France should develop its own independent nuclear capability. He has stood adamant against any easing of the terms of British admission to the Common Market and against any future supranational political community. In place of the latter he prefers what he calls the "Europe of the fatherlands."

FRANCO-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT

In view of French differences with Washington, and in view of past German support for American policy, the question naturally arises as to why Adenauer has chosen to throw in his lot with de Gaulle? A second question, but one that is hardly less important, concerns the profundity of this change. Does it represent a decisive turn in German foreign policy?

There seems to be little doubt that the Franco-German *rapprochement* is very popular with the German man in the street. When President de Gaulle visited West Germany last September his tour amounted to a prolonged triumphal procession. On the Chancellor's visit to France the preceding July, he too had been well received, if not so effusively. Franco-German reconciliation has now reached the point where, if the two peoples do not constitute a mutual admiration society, they nevertheless "cannot imagine themselves at war with each other."³ This sentiment is supplemented by hard economic

² *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 18, 1962, p. A 10.

³ *Washington Post*. Article by Flora Lewis, July 15, 1962, p. E 4.

interest, for French and German firms have bought into each other, have pooled patents, have opened branches in each other's territory. So there is some solid backing for a German foreign policy oriented towards France.

But this does not mean that German opinion endorses all features of French policy. It does not see friendship for France and British entry into Europe as mutually exclusive. And although the popularity of the United States may not be so high as it once was, it seems unlikely that many Germans are ready to entrust their security wholly to a combination of their own power with that of the French.

This is certainly the view of a number of officials around Adenauer who (if they do not openly contradict their chief) let it be known that they are somewhat less than enthusiastic over the Chancellor's pro-French policy. President Heinrich Lübke is reputed to have told General de Gaulle that a European Community embracing England would be more advantageous than the more limited association dominated by Germany and France. Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder has reiterated the view that Europe must be a partner of the United States, not a rival. Ludwig Erhard, supposedly the leading candidate as the Chancellor's successor, is said to feel the same way. Chancellor Adenauer himself, with his justifiable reputation for political shrewdness, may recognize that the French connection is no real substitute for the United States guarantees that are vital to West German security.

Whether this last estimate is accurate or not, but especially if it is, the question remains as to the Chancellor's motives in shaking hands with France, apart from the laudable desire for reconciliation. Here the ground is somewhat murky, and one must tread warily. The Chancellor may have been displeased with the more flexible attitude displayed by the Kennedy administration in its dealings with the Soviet Union, particularly in relation to Berlin. Secretary Dulles' hard

line accorded with the Chancellor's instincts and policies. In de Gaulle's lordly refusal to have anything to do with any negotiations on Berlin he sensed a kindred spirit. Displaying a receptive attitude toward French overtures, the Chancellor could bring pressure to bear on the United States to abandon what he believed to be its ill-conceived proposals, with their implied recognition of the East German regime.

There is also the possibility that the Chancellor has been won over to the view that Europe must have its own nuclear deterrent. According to one writer. "What Adenauer and his defense experts want is a powerful, fully committed nuclear capacity in Europe, responsive to Europe's control."⁴ Secretary Robert McNamara's rejection, at the Nato Council meeting in December, 1962, of the traditional sword-shield concept (casting nuclear power in the role of the shield) and his argument that any European struggle was likely to be conventional were poorly received in Germany. The Germans, like other Europeans, have professed increasing concern in the past year that United States stress on conventional forces marks an American unwillingness to come to their assistance with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack.

If the Chancellor accepts this contention, it is logical for him to join forces with those seeking an independent deterrent. Although Germany is forbidden by treaty from manufacturing atomic weapons, its research skills could be placed at French disposal in return for an equal share in any French-developed nuclear weapon. Although Adenauer has never shown a strong concern with military affairs, dissatisfaction over American policy in this area may have been another factor contributing to his decision to develop closer ties with France.

POLICY TOWARD BRITAIN

The Chancellor may also have been affected by fears that Britain's entry into the Common Market would diminish the role of Germany. The status and influence that the Federal Republic enjoys today is essentially

⁴ Charles J. V. Murphy, "NATO at a Nuclear Crossroads," *Fortune*, December, 1962, p. 87.

the result of German economic strength. The Germans had every right to expect that their strength, combined with their growing military power, would give them a dominant voice within the Europe of the Six, itself a growing force in world affairs.

British entry would change all that. It would create a counter-balance to German or Franco-German domination of the European Economic Community. For this very reason, as a matter of fact, the Benelux countries and Italy desire British entry into the market. The Chancellor, however, remains suspicious of British policy, and continues to take at best an equivocal attitude toward Britain's application to join the Common Market.⁵

From the Chancellor's standpoint, he has good reasons for his suspicions. Originally Britain would have nothing to do with the Common Market; stressing its Commonwealth and American ties, it seemed to set itself apart from Europe. Then it organized the rival European Free Trade Association. Britain changed its attitude only when it became apparent that the E.E.C. was a success, that it was outstripping Britain and that the advantages of the Commonwealth tie could not offset the loss of European markets. The Chancellor knows that the Labor party leadership is divided over entry into the Market, and that many Tories are up in arms over the prospect. If Britain is half-hearted, there is no reason to yield on membership conditions.

But Adenauer has always been even more mistrustful of what he regards as Britain's lamentable lack of firmness *vis à vis* the Soviet Union. He has not forgotten Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's abortive effort to play the mediator between East and West in his 1959 visit to Moscow. The British Left, should it return to power, might be even less palatable. Consequently the Chancellor is not going to favor British entry into the Community so long as he thinks it might dilute the strong anti-Communist orientation of its policy.

If Germany is mistrustful of England, the British people repay that mistrust in spades. While Franco-German reconciliation seems to have a solid popular basis, it is difficult to conceive of the same phenomenon occurring between Britain and Germany. Whatever its origin, and some trace it to the pounding of the blitz, this distrust appears to be a fact of international life today. When the Berlin crisis was at its height, and Americans were being adjured to stand fast, our correspondents abroad were warning that the people of Europe tended to see Berlin as a German interest, and had no desire to sacrifice themselves in its defense. Nowhere was this feeling stronger than in England.

By the same token, there is some popular mistrust of Germany among the Benelux countries, but it probably does not approach British proportions. The Benelux governments, however, are concerned over the possibility of Franco-German domination of the Common Market, and over the present drift of Franco-German policy. For that reason, they have been anxious to get Britain into the E.E.C., and even into the proposed European political union. There is irony in this, for Britain would probably not favor the tight supranational union envisioned by the Benelux powers, and at one time presumably favored by Bonn as well. At any rate, the present Franco-German collaboration is causing uneasiness in Belgium and the Netherlands.

As has been indicated, that collaboration, as far as Germany is concerned, is largely the personal product of Chancellor Adenauer, who continues to direct Bonn's foreign policy as he has in the past. But the Chancellor was backed into a political corner over the affair of *Der Spiegel*, and has pledged his word that he will retire. Given the tenacity with which he has clung to power, a certain scepticism toward this announcement may be justified. But sooner rather than later the years will catch up, even with Adenauer. When he disappears from the political scene, what foreign policy is the Federal Republic likely to follow in Europe?

⁵ After de Gaulle demanded the end of the negotiations for British entry, Adenauer was forced to try to save the Brussels conference on Britain's entry.

AFTER ADENAUER?

This writer is inclined to agree with Walter Lippmann that the Franco-German axis, so-called, will not survive Adenauer's tenure. It has already been pointed out that two of the Chancellor's putative successors, Schroeder and Erhard, are unhappy with it. Schroeder, particularly, is on record as stating that the Federal Republic will do all it can to enable Great Britain to become a member of the Common Market.⁶ On the same occasion he reiterated the view that Europe needs the political, economic and military strength of the United States in order to hold its own against the expansionist policies of the Communist bloc. The Federal Republic's safety could not be guaranteed without Nato and United States nuclear power.

Furthermore, Bonn's interest in eventual reunification cannot be realized through the French tie any more than it has thus far been realized through the United States and Nato. While the reconciliation of France and Germany may be genuine, a reunited Germany would hardly be in the interest of French "grandeur." If de Gaulle desires France to be the leader of Europe, he is unlikely to favor the reunification of a potentially stronger rival. And while the Bonn government, as has been noted, may pursue reunification only desultorily, the goal has not been and cannot be abandoned. It is conceivable that a Bonn government bent on reunification might some day find the American connection too constricting. But its flexibility would be even more hampered by a Gaullist orientation.⁷ In any event, German interests would still seem to be better served through the development of a strong European community, presumably eventually expanding to Atlantic dimensions, than through a policy based on an alliance with France. Such a broader community would wield more power, and would be able to play a more decisive role in world affairs.

⁶ Speech at Dortmund, June 4, 1962.

⁷ See Walter Lippmann, *Washington Post*, May 24, 1962, p. A 27.

⁸ For the text of this treaty, see pages 237-239 of this issue.

Despite these considerations, Chancellor Adenauer pressed forward with his policy of Franco-German friendship. That policy reached fruition with the signature of a Treaty of Cooperation on January 22, 1963.⁸ The Treaty is preceded by a Common Declaration in which the two nations state that they have signed the Treaty because they are convinced that the reconciliation of France and Germany is an historic event profoundly transforming the relations of the two peoples, and that cooperation between the two is a vital stage on the road to a united Europe.

The Treaty itself provides for the meeting of the respective Foreign Ministers every three months, plus monthly meetings of subordinate officials of the foreign ministries responsible for political, economic and cultural affairs. The respective Armed Forces ministers are also to meet every three months; and regular meetings are to take place between the responsible authorities in the fields of defense, education and youth. The Chiefs of Staff or their representatives are to meet every two months. An interministerial commission in each country will follow up the implementation of these exchanges.

An extensive program of consultation on all important questions of foreign policy is laid out, particularly those problems involving the European communities and European cooperation. Exchanges of armed forces personnel are to be increased. Educational contacts are to be increased, and each side pledges to take measures to increase instruction in the language of the other.

There is little doubt that this program has caused great anxiety among the other mem-

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"While the absence of a recent colonial past qualifies Germany as a development partner in some African eyes, the earlier colonial history of the Bismarckian Empire, strangely enough, is a factor also in inspiring confidence."

German Aid to Africa

By WOLFE W. SCHMOKE

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AT FIRST thought it may seem odd that Germany should be regarded by many African states as a source of capital and skilled manpower. Germany's political problems and aims are entirely European; her energies are largely absorbed by the East-West struggle, in which she is as much prize as participant. She has no recent colonial past to help to explain her interest in Africa today. She is not, like the United States, one of the main protagonists in the cold war, seeking to maintain or extend political influence in Africa by means of economic aid.

There are, however, other factors, which account for lively German interest and activities in the Black Continent. Continuous links with Africa have existed at least since the 1840's, when Hanseatic firms began trading on the West Coast, from Liberia to Cameroons, and in Zanzibar. German missionaries, at first working under British and Swiss auspices, were among the pioneers of Christianity in Africa. Explorers such as Barth and Nachtigal contributed greatly to solving the geographic mysteries of the continent. In scientific and scholarly work Germany contributed such figures as Leo Frobenius, Diedrich Westermann, and Robert Koch.

In short, German interest in Africa long predated her short-lived colonial activity, and continued lively after its end. World War II, of course, broke most of these connections, especially in the economic field. But almost

from the beginning of the West German economic recovery in the early 1950's, determined efforts were made to restore the links with Africa, and Africa again became an important market for German exports. With the creation of the Common Market the Federal Republic established an especially close relationship with that third of Africa, then still under French and Belgian rule, which entered into association with the European body.

German activity in the general field of development aid, which had begun on rather a small scale almost as soon as Germany herself ceased to be a recipient of aid, was undoubtedly stimulated by the strong pressure from the United States, especially in 1960-1961. One of the reasons that led the United States to urge its Allies, and especially the German government (in view of its favorable financial position) to expand aid efforts was the desire to relieve the unfavorable United States payments balance. The amount of publicity given to German development activity and its shortcomings in early 1961 contributed to considerable subsequent expansion of such activity in Africa and elsewhere.

While less attention has been given by the American press to German development aid in the last year or so, the energy which the Federal Republic has devoted to this endeavor has by no means decreased. The continuing procession of African leaders who have been welcomed in Bonn, as well as the visit of the

West German President, Heinrich Lübke, to West Africa in January, 1962, are some of the more obvious signs of the importance which is attached to the problems of the underdeveloped countries, and especially to those of Africa.

Expenditure of tax money for purposes of development aid to foreign countries is liable to encounter a good deal of political opposition in every democratic system. Our own annual congressional battle over the subject furnishes a vivid illustration. In the United States this opposition, based on fiscal frugality, has been generally overcome with the argument of foreign policy necessity. It is universally recognized that the United States is the leader of the Western world, and incomparably the economically strongest power within that bloc. Foreign aid has been defended by all administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, primarily as an instrument in the struggle against the expansion of communism, a weapon of the cold war.

FOREIGN AID ARGUMENT

In Germany the case is different. It is generally realized that the Federal Republic, when all is said and done, is a second-class power, unable to follow a truly independent foreign policy. There is no widespread belief that the actions of West Germany can have much influence on the outcome of the battle between the super-powers. German economic power, while great in European terms, cannot be expected to have a decisive impact in influencing the loyalties of the uncommitted world. Only in a strictly limited sense does the German government expect to reap political dividends from its investment in the underdeveloped countries.

The German opposition to development aid argues that any large export of capital is unjustifiable so long as many tasks remain undone at home. Within Germany, money is needed for housing, better roads, better hospitals, aid to refugees, and so forth. A recent

series in *Der Spiegel*, Germany's leading news magazine, described West Germany as an underdeveloped country. It is clear that this whole controversy revolves around the standard adopted for comparison: relative to the United States, for instance, Germany is undoubtedly poor and "under-developed"; relative to practically all countries in Asia, Africa, or Latin America, she is unbelievably rich.

How then does the German government justify its development plans? What are the purposes of its aid programs? In general, three points are stressed. First, there is the strictly humanitarian argument, stressing the moral obligation of the German people, who are part of the fortunate well-fed third of the world's population, to help the starving two-thirds to help themselves. Government spokesmen in this connection are able to remind Germans that

The Federal Republic of Germany . . . owes its present prosperity to a considerable extent to the development aid given to it through the Marshall Plan. . . .¹

Secondly, there is the economic argument of enlightened self-interest. By creating in the underdeveloped countries a higher standard of living and a greater demand for goods, development aid eventually should react favorably upon the German economy by stimulating exports. This avowed aim of German policy has led to frequent criticism of the German development effort as a form of market development or export subsidy. This criticism overlooks the simple fact that the immediate beneficiaries are undoubtedly the underdeveloped countries themselves. It is hard to see why an aid policy should be condemned simply because it involves benefits for the giver of aid as well as the receivers.

The political objects Germany hopes to achieve through its development effort are limited. In a recent press conference devoted particularly to the relations of the federal government with the new African states, Foreign Minister Schroeder pointed out that German aid is granted "basically without any political implications." He denied that Germany had any desire to influence the internal develop-

¹ From a speech by Foreign Minister Schroeder at Wiesbaden, October 5, 1962. *News from the German Embassy*, Vol. VI, No. 5.

ment of these states or wished to influence them to "decide, so to speak, between the Blocs."

This is not because we want particularly to appear as idealists, but because we believe that only this approach can keep us free from the suspicion of having motives of self-interest, motives which are contrary to African interests.

Basically, Schroeder explained, Germany hoped that her aid would contribute to strengthening African independence, as a defense against Soviet imperialism.²

There is, however, one specific "string" attached to all German aid, which arises out of Germany's peculiar political situation as a divided country. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine provides for the breaking of all diplomatic and economic relations with countries who recognize the East German regime. The doctrine has had to be applied only twice, against Yugoslavia and, quite recently, against Cuba, when these countries established relations with the Pankow government. In Africa, certain moves by Guinea's Sékou Touré in that direction in April, 1960, were answered with a threat to recall the German ambassador from Conakry, and to cease providing aid under an agreement concluded in November, 1959. The Guinean government quickly explained that it did not intend to recognize East Germany after all. A similar sequence of events had earlier taken place in the U.A.R.

AID STRINGS?

Germany justifies this political condition attached to its aid on the grounds of vital national interest. Minister Schroeder explained, in the press conference referred to above, that Germany followed with sympathy the realization of the right to self-determination of African peoples. She now expected the new African states "also [to] support this right when [German] political aims are involved." Various statements by African leaders visiting the Federal Republic seem to show that they understand and sympathize with this German

position. While the fear has been expressed that the Hallstein Doctrine might expose the Federal Republic to "blackmail" by African countries, there is little evidence so far to justify it. The underdeveloped countries seem more willing to accept a political condition for aid overtly stated and imposed on clear grounds of national interest than implicit conditions attached by the more powerful United States. The United States is easily suspected of wishing to herd these countries into its alliance system; the ex-imperial powers can also be accused of wishing to establish or maintain "neo-colonialist" domination over their former dependencies.

It is clear that the accidents of history which cut short Germany's career as an imperial power today give an important psychological benefit to the Federal Republic in its relations with the development countries, particularly in Africa. As the leaders of their respective blocs, the United States and Russia are naturally viewed with some suspicion in the newly independent African countries. Their aid is seen as an instrument designed to enlist recruits for a struggle which Africans insist is not theirs. As a secondary power, Germany is viewed as a preferable partner. This was illustrated in December, 1961, when Tanganyika chose to accept a German rather than an American loan, despite the fact that the interest on the latter was only one per cent, as compared with the German rate of three per cent.

While the absence of a *recent* colonial past qualifies Germany as a development partner in some African eyes, the earlier colonial history of the Bismarckian Empire, strangely enough, is a factor also in inspiring confidence. In Togoland, Cameroons, and Tanganyika members of the older generation, many of whom are in important positions, were educated in German schools and still speak German. They retained and passed on to their sons memories of German pioneer efforts in education and medicine and of sound administration. The harsher facets of German rule are largely forgotten, replaced by memories of the struggle for independence, in which the adversary was British or French, not German.

² Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, *The Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 45, p. 3.

Thus a young Togolese apprentice in Germany today speaks of the traditional admiration of his countrymen for that country and the President of the Togolese Chamber of Deputies addressed the German African Society in faultless though slightly old-fashioned German.

Another illustration of the continuity of history was furnished recently when 500 survivors of the German military forces in Cameroons, who could not be paid from 1914 to 1916 for lack of currency in the isolated colony and who had been prevented by the French from getting their back pay during the inter-war period, were finally paid. The person who urged these claims upon the German government was another survivor of this seemingly so distant period, the 90-year-old commander of the German East Africa forces in World War I, General von Lettow-Vorbeck.

ADMINISTERING AID

The absence of any recent colonial experience, however, has also hindered German development aid to Africa: there was no machinery or personnel suitable for the administration of the new programs. Britain and France could adapt their development activities (carried out under the Colonial Welfare and Development Fund and the French Fund for Educational and Social Development Investments) to the new conditions of African independence. The same trained personnel could be used. Germany, on the other hand, has experienced some difficulty in actually administering its aid commitments.

Even today, authority over this important activity is widely dispersed, with the Foreign Office, the Economics Ministry and the Ministry of Finance exercising at least as much authority and influence as the new Ministry for Economic Co-operation, headed by Walter Scheel, a member of the Free Democratic party. The lack of personnel with African experience occasionally creates needless misunderstandings and frictions in the administration of individual projects "on the spot."

³ Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, *The Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 40, p. 3.

By and large, however, these can be considered maladies of the German aid program that time will cure.

In discussing the scope of German aid to Africa and other areas and the exact sums involved, it should be stated at the outset that the German definition of development aid differs widely from that in vogue in this country. Whereas figures for American "foreign aid" generally refer solely to governmental grants and loans, the Germans insist that all capital exports to underdeveloped countries, public or private, constitute development aid in that they add to the total resources of the receiver countries.

On this basis, the Federal Ministry of Economics in figures published last September stated that between 1950 and June 30, 1962, a total of 19.2 billion Marks (\$4.8 billion) was furnished by Germany to the underdeveloped countries. Of this sum approximately 4 billion Marks, most of it in public funds, was in the form of multilateral aid, made up of German contributions to the Development Fund of the Common Market, United Nations Technical Aid, United Nations Special Funds, and credits to the World Bank and International Development Agency. Some 15.2 billion Marks was in the form of "bilateral aid." Of this latter sum 981 million Marks, or 6.4 per cent, was invested in Africa.³ This relatively small share, however, does not accurately reflect the current importance of that continent in the German aid effort.

During most of the 1950's, Africa was still under colonial rule and thus naturally received most of its development funds from the mother countries. Moreover, these totals include one-time restitution payments of large sums to countries occupied by Germany in World War II and to Israel. A better indication of the relative importance of Africa in German aid is furnished by figures for the German technical assistance program begun in 1956: from 1956 to 1961 \$125 million was expended. Of this total, Africa received 36.8 per cent. Of direct financial aid, a sum of approximately \$1.4 billion is currently committed or being paid out. Among the receivers are 20 African countries, whose com-

bined share of the total amounts to 22.98 per cent.⁴ Africa thus plays a far greater role in the German program than in that of the United States; in 1960 the United States expended only 4.3 per cent of its foreign aid in Africa.

The German government tends to be cautious with information about the exact share of German aid given to various countries, in order to avoid arousing the jealousies of those who might consider themselves unfairly treated. Some indication of the emphasis in German development aid may, however, perhaps be gathered from available figures for German private investment in Africa between 1952 and 1961:⁵

Egypt	18.5 million DM
Ethiopia	0.9 million DM
Algeria	25.6 million DM
Angola	0.9 million DM
Ivory Coast	2.5 million DM
Gabon	1.3 million DM
Ghana	0.8 million DM
Guinea	24.2 million DM
Cameroons	0.4 million DM
Central Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Brazzaville)	4.5 million DM
Liberia	34.1 million DM
Morocco	2.7 million DM
Mauretania	5.1 million DM
Nigeria	8.2 million DM
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	0.5 million DM
Senegal	0.2 million DM
Sudan	1.8 million DM
South Africa	80.1 million DM
Tanganyika	1.5 million DM
Others	3.1 million DM
Total Africa	221.9 million DM

Clearly, the large private investment in the Union of South Africa, reflecting the advanced economic position of that country, is a special case and no indication that public

development funds would be directed into that country to any great extent. German spokesmen deny that any conscious policy of favoring certain countries or areas over others is followed in the distribution of aid. Projects are approved strictly on the grounds of economic criteria (such as need) and, where private capital is involved, a minimum of security against arbitrary political acts. Specifically, the German government has decided not to give any special favors to the former German colonies, an attitude which in at least one case, that of the Cameroons, has led to some frictions and resentments.

There are a number of reasons that tend to concentrate the German development effort within Africa in the non-English speaking areas. Former British colonies retain important economic bonds with the United Kingdom and these—membership in the Sterling bloc, established investment patterns, and so forth—will tend to make them look primarily to the former mother country for aid. Germany's membership in the Common Market also means that the funds Bonn contributes to the Common Market Development Fund (\$246.5 million of the \$730 million committed for the 1963–1968 period) will naturally go to the Common Market associates in Africa—the former French and Belgian areas and Somalia. There can be no doubt that the Common Market link will also influence the direction of private aid. It was shown in the negotiations that led to the new agreement between the Common Market powers and the African associates that Germany wants to minimize the exclusive economic favors granted to the associated states, since it has close economic ties not only with other African countries, but also with non-African areas with competitive economies, especially in South America.

The German development aid program is based on certain assumptions and shows certain features that differentiate it from the efforts of other nations providing aid. In the first place we must note that in principle grants and loans are given only for specific projects previously agreed upon between Bonn and the recipient. This excludes to a

⁴ German Information Center, *Germany, Partner in World Progress*, New York, 1962.

⁵ Figures courtesy of German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

large extent the possibility that aid money may be drained off into the dark channels of corruption or into "national prestige" projects of no real economic value or productivity.

TRAINING MANPOWER

This does not mean that German aid has been provided only for purposes that promise a direct and immediate economic return. "Infra-structure," i.e., educational institutions, transport facilities, and so forth have not been neglected in the German program. It is in this area that Germany has pioneered an especially worthwhile effort—the training of middle-level manpower. Realizing that a country's economic progress depends to an enormous extent on the presence of a large group of working engineers, foremen, and technicians, Bonn has placed great emphasis on the training of these groups, both by providing apprenticeships in German firms and technical institutions and by establishing trade schools in Africa. This program has paid considerable dividends in good will. Close personal relations between Africans and Germans are established not only by the relationship between students and teachers but also by the effort that has been made to provide African students and apprentices with homes in German working class families.

One problem that has arisen is the frequent hesitancy of such Africans to return to their native countries on the expiration of their training period. Consequently greater emphasis will be placed in the future upon providing such technical training in institutions set up in Africa, which will also allow the training of larger numbers of individuals for the same expenditure. Commenting on the effectiveness of one such training program in the U.A.R., *The New York Times* termed it "one of the most successful experiments in student and cultural aid" and speculated that "West Germany may have left the United States and the Soviet Union far behind in the race for friends and influence in the Arab country."⁶ Realizing that trained manpower is at least as important as money in any in-

telligent aid program Germany has also taken steps to establish a "peace corps" designed on the American model. This organization will probably begin functioning in April, 1963.

No bias can be detected in German aid activity in favor of any particular aspects of economic development. On this subject there have been occasional complaints by African leaders, who feel that the developed, industrialized countries are hesitant to aid industries that might compete with imports from the donor countries, and prefer to develop African agriculture and raw material sources. The German record, at least, does not bear out this suspicion. Projects have ranged from the construction of a steel mill in Egypt to bauxite mining in Guinea, peanut oil processing mills in Mali, and textile manufacturing in Somalia.

A characteristic feature of German development aid is the large role assigned in the total effort to private enterprise. Minister for Economic Cooperation Walter Scheel has termed private investment "the best form of development aid." In addition to capital it furnishes initiative, know-how, and experience. Realizing that private investors require a climate of security and political stability Bonn spokesmen have repeatedly stressed the "obligation" of recipient countries to maintain stable governments and political conditions that will create business confidence.⁷ Countries with which Germany concludes aid agreements generally obligate themselves in coordinated investment agreements to refrain from uncompensated nationalization and to take no steps that would prevent the free transfer of profits. The idea of a worldwide agreement to this effect has often been advanced by Bonn.

Devices that allow better coordination between public aid and private investment and provide added security for investors include special tax privileges for overseas investments and profits, and capital guarantees against nationalization, transfer difficulties, war, revolution, and other risks of a political nature. Private industry also contributed more than \$250 million in loans to the aid fund the German government gathered in 1961 from a variety of sources as a first step in a great over-all increase in the German program. This fund

⁶ *The New York Times*, April 23, 1961, p. 6.

⁷ *The New York Times*, October 3, 1962, p. 57.

was further supplemented with contributions by the German state governments and the proceeds from the sale of part of the stock of the Volkswagen works to the public (as well as by budgetary means)—an imaginative way to make development aid a truly national rather than just a governmental concern.

One aspect of German aid that has often been criticized is undoubtedly connected with the strong role played in the program by private enterprise. In the past German aid was almost invariably in the form of "hard" loans, bearing an average interest of 3.5 per cent and maturing at 20 years. The fact that such loans were in demand seems to argue that this approach was not entirely unrealistic. At any rate the greater dependence now placed upon budgetary means—in the 1962 budget \$675 million was appropriated for aid (representing about 2.5 per cent of the total budget)—makes lower interest rates possible. A system has been adopted of averaging out the higher interest on money from the private sector and the lower rate on public money.

The general policy of aid in the form of loans rather than grants remains unchanged. Germany has been able to influence the development policies of the Common Market in this direction. Whereas the first Common Market Development Fund of \$580 million (the German share was \$127 million) was expended from 1958 to 1962 largely in the form of grants, the new fund of \$730 million, established in the course of the 1962 renegotiation of the agreements between the Common Market partners and their African associates, is expected to be allocated largely in the form of "soft," i.e., low-interest, long-maturity, loans.

Germany is satisfied that her aid program to the underdeveloped nations—those of Africa prominently among them—has now reached a stage in which her contributions compare favorably with those of the other highly advanced states. The German government is determined to maintain this effort and seems to have created a wide degree of public support for it. In regard to Africa, Bonn hopes that development aid will become one facet of wider partnership, already signaled

by the Common Market associations, which will nevertheless allow the African states to chart their own paths in political affairs.

For the future it is hoped that a greater degree of coordination between the aid efforts of the various donor countries and the international organizations in this field may be achieved. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) is generally looked upon as the ideal agency for such cooperation. The members provide more than 90 per cent of all aid coming from non-Communist countries; the proportion between the aid granted by the Eastern bloc and the O.E.C.D. members and Japan is 1:45. West Germany alone in 1960 gave more than three times as much as all Communist countries combined. Its Development Assistance Committee, consisting of the 11 members of the organization (including Japan, which is not an O.E.C.D. member) which are providing aid, has already undertaken studies of possibilities for a greater degree of coordination. Germany does not envisage this as a matter of multilateral participation in individual projects. This would clearly create problems of administration, with too many cooks spoiling the broth. Rather it is seen as an arrangement which, through the exchange of information, would make possible the coordination of the projects of various countries and international organizations in the interest of the total planned development of the economy of the receiver nation. An incidental benefit would be that by such mutual tuning of aid efforts the possibility of recipient states playing various aid offers against each other could be diminished.

Despite the various weaknesses and shortcomings we have indicated, the German program of development aid can be said to be a success. The Federal Republic's programs in Africa and elsewhere show how a country with limited resources can use them imaginatively.

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Although the West German press today obviously "lacks the luster which characterized some papers of the Hohenzollern empire and the Weimer republic," this specialist points out that in West Germany "86 per cent of all citizens read a newspaper at least once a week. All this shows that the press today is well entrenched in the Bonn republic."

How Free Is the German Press?

By FELIX E. HIRSCH

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EVERY MONDAY morning more than half a million West German intellectuals, businessmen, civil servants and other respectable citizens put down one D mark (more than they would spend for any other journal) at a newsstand to buy the issue of *Der Spiegel* which has just come off the press. They may not like everything they read there. Indeed, they often pretend to be disgusted, but they have the feeling that *Der Spiegel* tells them the truth, that it digs up unpleasant facts which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's authoritarian government has tried to keep from them, and that it fulfills the function of a genuine journalistic opposition which most of the country's newspapers, even the best ones, have failed to provide. The readers of *Der Spiegel* have somehow the same sentiments that their grandfathers had, when they perused *Die Zukunft*, the dull-looking little weekly in which Maximilian Harden attacked with singular ferocity those inept or decadent advisers of William II whose corruption nobody else would have dared to reveal.

Just as Harden succeeded in exposing the rottenness of the court camarilla and in forcing the removal of some paladins of the Emperor, Rudolf Augstein, the uninhibited editor of *Der Spiegel*, finally triumphed from his prison cell over his two mighty adversaries, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Defense

Minister Franz Josef Strauss, the man he hated most. Following the "*Spiegel* Affair" which he had vainly and unwisely tried to minimize, Adenauer was forced in December, 1962, to reshuffle his cabinet and to drop Strauss, although Strauss continued to enjoy, oddly enough, the backing of the electorate in his native Bavaria.

The *Spiegel* case provides us with valuable insights concerning the freedom of the press in West Germany. It is obvious that the journal used confidential, highly sensitive information when it exposed the poor performance of the German contingent at the recent Nato maneuvers. The sensational article, citing chapter and verse on the demonstrated ineptness of the German forces, was bound grossly to annoy Strauss and his advisers and to embarrass the whole government. It may well be argued that journalists should avoid meddling in the business of the military, a view which this writer held when he was an editor in the Weimar republic. On the other hand, Augstein and his men thought they performed a public service by telling what they considered to be the truth about the debacle of the *Bundeswehr*.

Instead of letting the storm blow over, legal action on a grand scale was taken by the government with the help of the federal attorneys, but behind the back of the Minister of Justice, a Free Democrat, from whom

Strauss and his friends expected objections. Augstein and several of his editors were jailed and their office raided in the middle of the night. Strauss personally intervened to make sure that a *Spiegel* editor who was vacationing in Spain was imprisoned and extradited, contrary to international law. The Minister had the audacity to deny the fact for a while; this finally made his ouster inevitable. Augstein was kept imprisoned but was released in February, 1963. Several of his collaborators had been freed earlier.

Some serious questions remain: Was the unorthodox method of prosecution used by the government legitimate? Was it commensurate with the alleged crime *Der Spiegel* is charged with? Does a seemingly truthful report on the inefficiency of the German armed forces—containing facts that are well known abroad—constitute *Landes-Verrat* (high treason), because the information was secured by dubious means? As these lines are written, no satisfactory answer has yet come from Bonn. The official report on the *Spiegel* case, which was issued by the Federal Minister of Justice on January 31, 1963, on behalf of all government agencies concerned, was received critically by leading German newspapers.

However, the affair has had at least one very salutary result. Public opinion—including many people who intensely dislike the journalistic methods and the tone of *Der Spiegel*—has been aroused as rarely before and has taken a firm stand for the freedom of the press and for the observance of due process of law. This outcry goes a long way toward assuring us that democracy is growing roots in the Bonn republic at last.

As we try to appraise the West German press of today, it is obvious that it lacks the luster which characterized some papers of the Hohenzollern empire and the Weimar republic. Gone are the golden days before the turn of the century when great writers like Theodor Fontane would serve as drama critics to give real distinction to the *Feuilleton*, i.e., the literary section. The tradition of brilliant editorial writing has few adepts left. For a quarter of a century, until he

went into exile in 1933, Theodor Wolff's resplendent editorial essays, occupying large parts of front and second page, guaranteed the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the champion of liberal democracy, hundreds of thousands of devoted readers at home and abroad. In the *Vossische Zeitung*, whose hallowed literary traditions went back to the days of the dramatist and critic Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the editor Georg Bernhard tried to do likewise.

By and large, editorial writing today looks pale compared with the best of those days. This is due to the fact that the Allied occupation authorities saw to it in the first years after the war that newspapers would be politically independent and, as a rule, non-partisan. Therefore, vigorous party papers like the Social Democratic *Vorwärts* and *Rheinische Zeitung*, with such stalwart editors as Friedrich Stampfer and William Sollmann, both of whom came to these shores in the Hitler era, hardly exist today. The colorless weekly *Vorwärts*, issued by the Social Democratic party as its official mouthpiece, has little more than the name in common with its fighting namesake of another era.

While this is a distinct loss, there is a positive side to the political independence of the newspapers. In the Weimar republic, poisonous attacks on the personal honor and national "reliability" of leading statesmen (like President Friedrich Ebert and Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann) were the order of the day. Not only Nazi sheets, but also powerful reactionary newspapers, especially the chain owned by Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the German Nationalists, made a habit of this. No respectable paper of the Bonn republic would even consider engaging in character assassination. The arrogant nationalism which emanated from large segments of the German press long before the days of Hitler and Goebbels has been replaced by honest efforts to understand foreign countries and to analyze their policies fairly. Many editors of the Bonn republic have lent their moral support to the cause of European cooperation.

If a newspaper returns to the evil practices

of the previous generation, its readers are quickly heard from. When this writer was teaching in Germany last year, he was impressed by an example of an aroused readership which he could observe at close-hand. The whole intelligentsia of Heidelberg was bristling with indignation, because the otherwise respected local paper, the *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung*, had featured an aggressively phrased review of the book *Der erzwungene Krieg* by an American, David L. Hoggan, who in his fat tome (not published in the United States) tried to whitewash Hitler and to put the responsibility for the outbreak of World War II on British and Polish statesmen. The paper had been founded by Theodor Heuss, the country's most distinguished man of letters and later federal president, right after the war; its present editors ought to have known better than to print such inflammatory distortions. The *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung* was finally compelled to publish long and vigorous protests by two notable historians of the University, Werner Conze and Rudolf von Albertini, who convincingly demonstrated the worthlessness of Hoggan's interpretation. Otherwise, only one paper of some country-wide significance, the weekly *Deutsche Soldatenzeitung*, caters in each issue to the incorrigible nationalists of a bygone era; it reads as if it had been written in 1933 rather than 1963.

It is not difficult to discern some major trends in the German press of the twentieth century. The Weimar republic, the period of greatest flowering, was characterized by a maximum of diversification. First, there were four or five papers of international standing, with editors, correspondents and literary contributors of great renown; *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Vossische Zeitung*, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Kölnische Zeitung*, were in this class. Next there were the party papers, ranging from the conservative *Kreuz-Zeitung* to the Communist *Rote Fahne*; some of them had far more political influence than the number

of their subscribers would have indicated. The so-called *Generalanzeiger* type formed the third group; these were respectable papers of mass appeal, without any strict political affiliation. The so-called *Boulevard* papers, which emphasized the *Feuilleton* and concentrated on the lighter side of life and society news without neglecting politics altogether, had hundreds of thousands of readers.

In Berlin, three concerns dominated the scene, each of them including prosperous papers of several types; these were the houses of Ullstein, Mosse and Scherl. Most of the country's better newspapers were edited by highly educated, often brilliant men; many of them held Ph.D. degrees and possessed a wealth of cultural or political experience. Prince Bismarck had believed that a journalist was "a man who has missed his calling," but the social status of editors in the first third of our century was very high. It is characteristic that most of the confidants of a statesman such as Gustav Stresemann were found not in the Foreign Office, but among journalists.

The Third Reich ended all these auspicious developments. This was the period in which the German press was *gleichgeschaltet*, i.e., "coordinated."¹ Thereby the traditional diversity of the press was replaced by rigid conformity, if not uniformity. That led to tremendous drops in circulation; who would read a paper that was edited according to the most stringent government regulations? Joseph Goebbels, the new Minister of Propaganda, turned the newspapermen who had been proud of their independence into civil servants who would have to obey every whim of the Nazi authorities. After a few years, editors were even forbidden to criticize theatre performances; henceforth, they could merely report on what they saw. "Unreliable" journalists were blacklisted or, even worse, imprisoned. This happened to the writer's successor in the *Berliner Tageblatt* who had aroused Goebbels' ire by some innocuous report. The Minister himself called him in and told him he wanted to give him an "education" and that was why he was sending him to a concentration camp.

¹ See my article in *The New York Times Magazine*, May 11, 1958.

It is easy to criticize the newspapermen who stayed on their jobs in those years, for their lack of courage and for their subservience coupled with cynicism. Actually, they had no alternative, unless they were willing to emigrate. Whoever reads the recently published war-time diaries *Berliner Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1942-1945* of Ursula von Kardoff, scion of a distinguished aristocratic family and member of the editorial staff of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, needs no further proof that many of these journalists remained decent people who loathed having to serve a government for whose disappearance they were praying.

THE PRESS SINCE THE WAR

None of the papers tainted with the Nazi spirit survived the collapse of the Third Reich. The Allied occupation authorities created some papers of their own, of which the *Neue Zeitung* was the shining example. They also installed some dyed-in-the-wool anti-Nazis in the comparatively few newspapers they licensed. They saw to it that these editors (very often boards of three men from different parties) would adhere to the tenets of American and English journalism. They insisted especially on a clear-cut division of news and editorial comment to which the German press had not been accustomed. It is interesting to observe that these licensed papers have retained their leadership in many cities against whatever competitors appeared on the scene later.

Whereas three big publishing concerns flourished in the earlier century, now only one firm is gigantic, the firm of Axel Springer. He controls the *Bild-Zeitung*, a low-caliber tabloid with a nationwide circulation of 3,700,000, *Die Welt*, *Das Hamburger Abendblatt* and some Berlin papers formerly owned by Ullstein. Springer recently announced plans to build a tremendous printing plant in the heart of West Berlin. Except for Springer's sprawling empire, about which some German specialists have apprehensions, many major papers have maintained their independence. By and large, they have done well. Since television commercials are se-

verely restricted, the papers have been able to hold on to most of the advertising. The weekend editions of the country's three leading papers, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Welt* (Hamburg and Essen) and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), seem to be real gold mines for the publishers. There are not only the customary big ads of department stores and standard brands, but also pages and pages of industrial personnel want ads. These weekend editions enjoy a heavy circulation, somewhere above 300,000 copies, throughout the country.

It is interesting to observe that most major newspapers, while outwardly "independent," have actually supported the Adenauer government all along. Only in recent times has *Die Welt* openly attacked the Chancellor. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* still leans toward Adenauer, although its polished editorials sometimes have a critical undertone. Another paper in the same city, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, is one of the few newspapers backing the Social Democratic party on basic issues. Frankfurt is among the few cities which house two major papers; the same holds true for prosperous Stuttgart with the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* and *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, for Munich with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Münchener Merkur*, and a few other places. In most cities, one paper practically enjoys a monopoly, while formerly three or four papers served the various political and social tastes of the local public. This monopoly may mean a wider news coverage and a better service to the public, but it also is the end of free competition.

Only one German city has kept its traditional variety of newspapers. This is West Berlin. Once upon a time, it was a journalistic center with which only Paris could compare on the continent. Today its soil is stony. Newspapers located there have great difficulty in extending their circulation beyond the beleaguered city. Nevertheless, *Tagesspiegel*, a liberal bourgeois paper of high standards, and *Telegraf*, voice of the Social Democratic party (veteran Paul Löbe, long-time President of the Reichstag, is still on its editorial board), are struggling manfully against heavy

odds. Adenauer's policies are presented in *Der Tag*, headed by Karl Willy Beer, one of the ablest C.D.U. editors. The reborn *Berliner Morgenpost* has wide popular appeal, but does not measure up to its famous predecessor. There are also other reasonably good papers. They look even more attractive when one compares them with the journalistic products from the other side of the Wall: Ulbricht's *Neues Deutschland*, the most important paper of the D.D.R., is as unpalatable as the *Völkische Beobachter* used to be.

The editorial leadership of the German press today seems to be a curious blend of the last giants of the Weimar era and the rising talents of the young generation. Again one example may suffice. The finest German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, has on its editorial board Benno Reifenberg, one of the renowned former editors of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Erich Dombrowski, who made his name as political editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and Erich Welter, who was the last editor-in-chief of the *Vossische Zeitung*. As one visits editorial offices of various papers, he finds more and more young people attaining positions of importance. They grew up during or after the war; they are aliens to the Nazi philosophy, and Goebbels is a name from the history books only. The middle generation, however, is less fully represented. Too many died in the war; others had been so involved in the politics of the Third Reich that they did not appear trustworthy after 1945; and some had gone into exile.

JOURNALS OF OPINION

Right after the war, journals of opinion mushroomed in Germany as never before. They served as sounding boards for new ideas. They helped to educate the intelligentsia for the tasks in a new democracy. Several of the best among these monthlies, like *Wandlung* and *Gegenwart* (semi-monthly) did not survive. Others are still around, but they have a precarious existence, since the number of their readers has dwindled and advertisers, as a rule, are not interested in journals of opinion. Among those that are

still alive, *Frankfurter Hefte*, edited by Eugen Kogon, and *Deutsche Rundschau*, a monthly with a long noble tradition, come first to mind. *Der Merkur*, the journal with the highest literary standards, barely escaped discontinuation last fall; finally, a new publisher took it over, but its circulation is down to 4,000 copies. Perhaps the most prosperous and liveliest among these journals is *Der Monat*, created by Melvin Lasky, a young American, in the early postwar era and now edited by Fritz Allemann, an able Swiss journalist.

While most of these high-caliber publications have a hard time, some weekly journals of opinion have gained greater prominence and enjoy an increasing following. The best of them, *Die Zeit*, has announced that it has now a circulation of 180,000, that is, about three times as much as in 1954. It is superbly edited and presents the keenest available week-by-week analysis of German political, economic and cultural trends. Its political editor, Countess Marion Dönhoff, is one of the most brilliant and most forthright journalists of the country. *Die Zeit*, while owned by a former C.D.U. member of the Bundestag, has often been severely critical of Dr. Adenauer's policies. The other two weeklies in the same class, the Protestant *Christ und Welt* (about 145,000) and the Catholic *Rheinischer Merkur* (70,000) also exert a strong influence on the intelligentsia; far in

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Felix E. Hirsch served in the Weimar republic for ten years as political editor of leading democratic newspapers, including the "Berliner Tageblatt." Last year he returned for a semester to his native land, as visiting professor of history at the Institute of Technology in Karlsruhe, the oldest German technical university. He also gave lectures on the Weimar republic at the Universities of Freiburg, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Mainz and Munich. Recently, he contributed an essay on Stresemann and Adenauer to *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch* (London, Longmans Green).

"As the Common Market develops, appeals for more government intervention in the West German economy will probably increase," this author comments. "Not only agriculture, but also other segments of the economy which are adversely affected by the disappearance of tariff barriers within the Common Market will certainly request government help."

West Germany's Economic Miracle

By WALTER STRUVE

Instructor in History, Princeton University

AFTER MORE than a decade of almost uninterrupted material progress, many West Germans are becoming anxious about the future of the "miracle" which raised their country from the ashes of World War II and made it the world's greatest industrial nation after the United States and the Soviet Union. Is West Germany's "economic miracle" in danger of coming to an end?

During the past two years there have been several signs that the period of rapid economic development has closed. Although the slight revaluation of the German Mark (DM)¹ in March, 1961, helped to achieve the intended goal of decreasing the country's enormous international reserves and increasing its imports, many businessmen feared that West German exports faced much stiffer competition in the 1960's than during the 1950's. In 1962, several striking business failures occurred. One of the most widely publicized failures toppled the vast industrial empire which the former "boy-wonder" Willy Schlieker had created since the war. Despite persistent rumors that Schlieker had been "sabotaged" by Ruhr magnates who had always resented him as an interloper, some Germans preferred to interpret his sudden

bankruptcy as evidence of a crisis in the shipping and shipbuilding industry.

Less dramatic, although more significant, than Schlieker's downfall were indications that the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) had ceased to increase nearly as rapidly as during the decade of the 1950's, when the average annual increase exceeded 10 per cent. Preliminary estimates for 1962 suggested that the G.N.P. had risen to 333 billion DM, but that more than half of the increase of 23 billion DM had been cancelled out by inflation. Thus during 1962 the economy probably expanded by slightly over 3 per cent. In contrast to the "creeping stagnation" of the American economy, an increase of 3 per cent still appeared respectable. Yet many observers agreed that West Germany had entered a period during which her economic growth would be much less rapid than that of a number of her less highly industrialized neighbors in eastern and western Europe.

The slowing down of the postwar boom helped to reinvigorate controversy over some basic economic issues which had been receding into the background. Perhaps it would now be more accurate to say that many West Germany began to discuss very seriously what they would do with the abundance which they were producing. Behind much of the public discussion lay two major issues: the "proper" distribution of the fruits of the

¹ Before the revaluation, the exchange rate was roughly 1 DM = \$.24. Today, the exchange rate is roughly 1 DM = \$.25.

economy, and the "appropriate" role of the government in economic matters.

Both issues involved the future of the policies to which the Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, and his followers have attributed the postwar "miracle." Erhard and other proponents of a "socially conscious [sic] free market economy" (*soziale Marktwirtschaft*) have sought to establish an economy which would operate in accordance with most of the laws of nineteenth century laissez-faire economics, while avoiding the undesirable effects of business cycles. The doctrines of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* do not permit the government to play an active role in the distribution of national wealth or income. The primary economic function of the government is conceived of as the preservation of competition. Anti-cyclical stabilizing measures, primarily in the form of fiscal policies, should be designed to operate as automatically as possible. If major inequalities in income arise, they should be moderated by a progressive income tax mild enough not to interfere with incentives.

Critics as well as proponents of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* have been quick to point out that its doctrines have not been applied consistently. For example, no effective anti-monopoly laws exist in West Germany, and the existing law has not been applied vigorously. After the conclusion of the Allies' "trust-busting" campaign during the early years of the military occupation, industry re-consolidated and recartelized, often with the tacit blessing of the former "trust-busters." By 1958, eight trusts controlled 75 per cent of the crude steel production, 80 per cent of the raw iron production, 60 per cent of the rolled steel production, and 36 per cent of the coal production. The Common Market, which also has no effective anti-monopoly legislation, will probably further the process of cartelization in West German industry, as in Western European industry in general.

Although the application of the doctrines of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* has been far from complete, they have played a key role in the postwar development of West Germany. As Erhard has always emphasized, he and his

co-workers acted in the belief that the "economically strong," (whose ownership of real estate, industrial properties, and industrial securities put them at a great advantage at the time of the currency reform in 1948) would eventually pull up the "economically weak," who had no property or whose savings had been destroyed.

PROSPERITY

Thanks to stimulants such as massive American aid and the Korean boom, Erhard's predictions came true. Most of West Germany's 54 million residents have benefited greatly from the development of the economy since 1948. The "social pie" (*Sozialkuchen*), to use a contemporary German term, has become much thicker and richer.

The "economic miracle" provided the framework within which West Germany could develop a stable social structure. The structure itself does not differ appreciably from that which existed before 1945. Although one-fourth of the gainfully employed are now salaried employees, the trend toward an expanding force of white collar workers began at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite the upheavals of the immediate post-war years, social mobility has been significantly less than in the United States. Higher education, one of the most important avenues to social ascent in modern society, involves only a tiny segment of the population. Throughout Western Europe the proportion of the population enrolled in institutions of higher education is much lower than in the United States, but only 5 per cent of the university students in West Germany come from working-class families, as compared to about 25 per cent in Great Britain. The percentage for West Germany is virtually the same today as it was during the Weimar Republic.

Increasing concentration of wealth in the upper-most strata of society has accompanied the general prosperity. Economic recovery and expansion depended upon a very high rate of investment. Taxation laws encouraged the employer to reinvest his profits rather than to disburse them in the form of

wages. Three years ago a high government official estimated that the number of millionaires (in DM) had increased from 3,610 in 1954 to 8,759 in 1958.

Until recently the percentage of the national income received by wage earners and salaried employees had remained almost constant for more than a decade. After hovering around 60 per cent, the percentage finally rose to 62.3 per cent in 1961. But the increase of 3.1 per cent since 1950 did not entail a substantial alteration in the distribution of the national income. For the slight increase was distributed among 8 million more recipients of wages and salaries than in 1950.

While a great quantity of consumer goods has become available, the domestic market remains underdeveloped in comparison with the American market. As during the brief period of prosperity preceding the Great Depression of the 1930's, industry generally prefers to produce capital goods rather than consumer goods. Three-quarters of the workers and almost one-half of the officials (*Beamten*) still do not have a bath in their apartments or houses.

The doctrines of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* have helped to encourage the traditional emphasis of German industry upon production for export. In 1962, the Volkswagen plants, for example, exported 57.5 per cent of their total production, even though there were only about 108 motor vehicles for every 1,000 inhabitants in West Germany, as compared to about 421 in the United States and about 168 in France.

As yet, neither the operation of the economy nor the doctrines of *soziale Marktwirtschaft* have been put to the test of a serious crisis. Little evidence suggests that a large or influential segment of the population has a strong commitment to the full realization of a free market economy.

UNIONS AND LABOR

The recent concentration of the West German labor unions on the wages of their members may hardly appear surprising to an American. But Germans, like most Europeans, have not been accustomed to "business

unions" on the American model. Traditionally, German unions have had two basic if often conflicting goals: the improvement of the welfare of their members within the existing order of society and the creation of a radically new social order.

Economic and political developments have effected a profound transformation of the West German unions. Until the destruction of the unions at the outset of the Third Reich, the unions had been closely associated with political activities. In many respects, the largest unions and the Social Democratic party formed a single organization. After World War II the unions decided to create a unified, "politically neutral" trade union federation (the D.G.B.). As the major political parties moved to the right, the D.G.B.'s vision of a new society faded.

The narrowing of the gap between the major political parties averted the danger of a split in the D.G.B. Although the majority of the D.G.B.'s members and officials are closely identified with the Social Democrats, a strong minority has retained its ties to the Christian Democrats. Attempts from the right to found a "Christian" union to compete with the D.G.B. have been largely in vain. Similarly, a few dissidents from the left, such as Viktor Agartz, an early president of the D.G.B., recently seceded from the federation. Having abandoned the hope of pushing the Social Democrats to the left and renouncing the ideal of a unified trade union federation, Agartz and his followers have sought—with little success—to found a socialist union linked to a new socialist party.

Ironically, both the strengths and the weaknesses of the D.G.B. make it more suitable for pursuit of broad socio-political goals than for the immediate "bread-and-butter" issues pursued by American unions. The 16 industrial unions forming the D.G.B. are weak at the local level. Works councils, which were first established during the Weimar Republic and which were revived after World War II, restrict the sphere of union activity. The works councils perform many functions, which local unions handle in the United States, such as negotiations with management

in grievances involving various types of work rules.

Even the introduction of "codetermination," which began in the iron and steel industry under the occupation and provided for the participation of some employee representatives in management, has been a mixed blessing to the D.G.B. The employee representatives who sit on the supervisory board of a company are elected as representatives of the entire working force, and not simply of the union members.

Codetermination has promoted the integration of the unions, their members, and their officials into the existing socio-economic order. Smoother relations between management and labor at the plant level and the introduction of some "new blood" into the ranks of management have been important by-products of codetermination. The employee representatives have tended to identify themselves with the company as much as with their "constituents." Needless to say, many of the owners and managers who once fought bitterly against codetermination have now accepted the new institution, or have become enthusiastic supporters of it.

Not only has the scope of the D.G.B.'s activities narrowed, but its membership has grown very slowly. Despite an expansion of almost 67 per cent in the non-agricultural working force since 1949, the number of members in the D.G.B.'s unions has increased less than 20 per cent. Less than half the eligible workers are members.

During the 1950's the D.G.B. concentrated on obtaining parliamentary legislation favorable toward labor. More recently, the D.G.B. has stressed negotiations with the employers' associations over wage contracts. As the demands of the D.G.B. have come to include less and less emphasis upon fundamental changes in the existing order of society, the unions have attempted simply to gain a larger share of the "national pie" through higher wages. Part of the impetus behind the new campaign also stems from anxiety about the effects of automation which have already become apparent in some industries.

Since the mid-1950's full employment has placed the D.G.B. in an excellent bargaining position. Now almost fully absorbed into West German society, the 13 million East German refugees no longer depress wages. The erection of the "Wall" in Berlin in August, 1961, further aggravated the labor shortage by halting the stream of "refugees" from the German Democratic Republic who hoped to share in the "economic miracle." The importation of non-German labor has brought over 650,000 unskilled workers from the less industrialized countries of Europe (primarily from Italy, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia), without solving the labor shortage.

Yet unlike American "business unions," German unions have seldom been inclined to regard the strike as a normal device in management-labor relations. The virtual absence of strikes in West Germany continues to astonish foreign observers. As late as 1960, less than 38,000 working days were lost as a result of strikes and lockouts. During the same year, over 476,000 days were lost in the Netherlands, over 3 million in the United Kingdom, and over 19 million in the United States. Although the number of strikes in West Germany has increased somewhat during the past two years and the D.G.B. has been calling for more direct use of the strike as a weapon, there seems little likelihood that the threat of extensive strikes will be realized—unless economic conditions change drastically.

ATTITUDES OF BUSINESS

Representatives of business have expressed serious alarm at the demands of the unions for higher wages and larger social benefits. Although the large industrial enterprises seem to have no objections to a moderate amount of "creeping inflation," most businessmen use the familiar catchword "wage-price spiral" to condemn wage increases. Such arguments appeal directly to individuals living on pensions and to a substantial segment of the middle class (*Mittelstand*). Over eight million old people receive part or all of their incomes from pensions.

Some journalists have also made an attempt on a moderate scale to appeal to the resentment which many a member of the middle class harbors against the worker who buys a motorbike or refrigerator. Thus a newspaper in the Ruhr recently complained: "Today the privileged stratum of society is the working class, and it is proceeding systematically to improve and extend its privileges."²

Many publications have also stressed other arguments against wage increases: recent increases in wages have exceeded increases in productivity; business lacks sufficient capital for reinvestment; German exports have suffered. During the period from 1959 through 1961 industrial wages rose 20.9 per cent in the Federal Republic and only 5.8 per cent in the United States. During the same period, production costs per unit increased 13.5 per cent in the Federal Republic and only 1 per cent in the United States.

Preliminary statistics for 1962 indicated that productivity per worker had increased 7.4 per cent in the Federal Republic, while wages climbed 9 per cent. When confronted with such statistics, the unions assert that labor has been making up for low wages during the early years of the "miracle" and that the worker should receive a greater share of business profits.

What direct methods does business have for maintaining its interests in the face of mounting union demands? In addition to the formation of trusts, cartels, and monopolies—which may protect business from both competitors and labor—West German businessmen have employed two other methods. The most important organizations of business, the Association of German Industry (B.D.I.) and the Association of German Employers (B.D.A.), seek to influence parliamentary legislation. The subdivisions of the B.D.A. also act as representatives of the employers in collective bargaining with the unions.

Since last summer the president of the

B.D.A., H. C. Paulssen, has been urging employers to use every possible legal means to resist wage demands. Paulssen has criticized businessmen for fearing strikes and has recommended lockouts if necessary.

His strategy is carefully geared to the present situation in the Federal Republic. As in the United States, strikes are usually very unpopular with the "consumer." Apparently, Paulssen anticipates that the great reluctance of the German worker to strike, as well as the hostility of the general public toward strikes, will compel the unions to alter their demands. If Paulssen has miscalculated and strikes become widespread, a massive drain upon the unions' large, well-invested strike funds might disrupt the economy.

Especially in the Free Democratic party (a member of Adenauer's coalition government) and in some business circles, talk of introducing compulsory arbitration or a stringent German version of the Taft-Hartley Act has increased. But at the moment, compulsory arbitration, which was used during the Weimar Republic, has little appeal for either employers or unions. Under the present alignment of political forces, both feel very sensitive about any possible infringement of their "bargaining autonomy."

In 1962, the D.G.B. finally took a clear stand against the "emergency laws" (*Notstandsgesetzgebung*) which the present foreign minister, Gerhard Schroeder, tried to introduce into parliament in 1958 when he was the minister of the interior. Advocates of the new laws, which the Social Democrats now support, argue that the government must have expanded powers to cope with a future "national emergency." Some Germans; notably Otto Brenner, the president of the Metal Workers' Union and the leader of the "left wing" within the D.G.B., fear that "emergency laws" might be used to crush the unions. Although the D.G.B. has agreed not to call a political strike if the laws are enacted "through the regular channels" (*ordnungsgemäss*); political strikes have been threatened if either the Bonn Constitution or the independence of the unions is "jeopardized."

² *Westdeutsche Rundschau* (Wuppertal), May 1, 1961.

The Government has hesitated to undertake a comprehensive program to regulate labor relations or to combat inflation. Erhard has pleaded with both labor and management to refrain from increases in wages or prices. The unions have resented such appeals for "moderation," which, they feel, are directed primarily against labor. They have pointed to Erhard's unsuccessful admonition against increases in automobile prices in March, 1962, as an indication of the inability of "moral exhortations" to alter the dynamics of a free market economy. Many Germans have contrasted Erhard's failure with President Kennedy's success in the American steel price dispute.

Occasionally the government has intervened directly to assist sagging industries when a broad consensus favorable toward intervention existed, or when pressure groups were especially effective in pushing their demands.

DIFFICULTIES IN AGRICULTURE

The struggle in Brussels for a Common Market farm policy during the early winter of 1961-1962 attracted international attention to West Germany's agricultural difficulties. Although German representatives in Brussels may have hoped to use the protests of their farmers as a bargaining point to win concessions for their industry, the agrarian problem has plagued West Germany for the past decade. Despite a substantial decline in the relative size of the rural population during the past century, over 14 per cent of the West Germans still depend upon incomes from agriculture or forestry.

The agricultural problem has little to do with the effects of the postwar partitioning of Germany. Ever since the industrial revolution, western Germany has had to import a substantial portion of its foodstuffs, but few of the imports came from eastern Germany.

Unlike the United States, West Germany does not suffer from an agricultural surplus. With the exception of tree nurseries and a few other highly specialized enterprises, West German agriculture cannot compete inter-

nationally. Grain prices are substantially higher than in France, the Netherlands, and even Britain. Agricultural cooperatives are underdeveloped in comparison with those in Scandinavia and most other Western European countries.

Throughout modern history, the basic agricultural unit in western Germany has been the small peasant plot. Despite a tendency toward the consolidation of small holdings to form medium-sized holdings from 25 to 370 acres, most of the farms remain unspecialized, "one-family" undertakings.

From 1956 to 1962, the government furnished over 10 billion DM in subsidies to agriculture. These subsidies were not designed to promote agricultural efficiency. Rather, they were designed to maintain the "family farm" as a way of life. Government policies have not encouraged farmers to concentrate upon growing the type of products in which West Germany might become more competitive.

The "Green Front," as the Germans have nicknamed well-organized agrarian interest groups, has strong ties with Adenauer's Christian Democrats. Thus far the peasants have not resorted to the bomb-throwing which disrupted the German countryside during the Great Depression, but mass protest meetings have begun. By the end of 1962 the government seemed more inclined to make some concessions to the demands of the "Green Front" than to promote the structural and social changes in the countryside which might help to place the agrarian sector of the economy on a sounder footing.

The Common Market farm policy presents West German agriculture with its most serious challenge since the war. Competition from

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Walter Struve received a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service, enabling him to spend the academic year 1960-1961 in Berlin. He has also studied at the University of Kiel under a Fulbright grant. He is currently working on a study of German élite theories during the Weimar Republic.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Franco-German Treaty of Reconciliation

On January 22, 1963, France and West Germany signed a treaty providing for closer cooperation in foreign affairs, defense, education, and scientific research. The complete texts of this treaty and the joint declaration made by French President Charles de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer follow:

The Treaty Text

Following the joint declaration of the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated January 22, 1963, on the organization and principles of cooperation between the two states, the following arrangements have been agreed to:

ORGANIZATION

1. The heads of state and government will give the necessary directives in accordance with needs and will follow regularly the application of the program fixed hereafter. They will meet to this effect each time this will be necessary and, in principle, at least twice a year.

2. The Foreign Ministers will supervise the execution of the program as a whole. They will meet at least every three months. Without prejudicing contacts normally established through embassies, high officials of the two Foreign Ministries charged respectively with political, economic and cultural affairs will meet each month alternatively in Paris and Bonn to assess current problems and prepare the meeting of Ministers. On the other hand, the diplomatic missions and the consulates of the two countries, as well as their permanent representation at international organizations, will make all contacts necessary on problems of common interest.

3. Regular meetings will take place between the responsible authorities of the two countries in the fields of defense, education and youth. They will in no way affect the functioning of already existing organisms—the Franco-German Cultural Commission and the Permanent Staff Group—whose activities will, on the contrary, be developed. The Foreign Ministers will be represented at these meetings to insure the overall coordination of cooperation.

a. The Armed Forces or Defense Ministers will meet at least once every three months. Likewise, the French Minister of Education will meet, according to the same rhythm, the personality who will be designated on the German side to follow the program of cooperation on the cultural plan.

b. The Chiefs of Staff of the two countries will meet at least once every two months. Should they be unable to attend, they will be replaced by their responsible representatives.

c. The French High Commissioner for Youth and Sports will meet, at least once every two months, the Federal Minister of Family and Youth or his representative.

4. In each of the two countries an inter-ministerial commission will be charged with following the problems of cooperation. It will be presided over by a high official of the Foreign Ministries and will include representatives of all the interested administrations. Its role will be to coordinate the ac-

tion of the interested ministries and to make periodically a report to its government on the state of Franco-German cooperation. It will also have the task of presenting all useful suggestions with a view to the execution of the program and its extension to new fields.

PROGRAM

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The two Governments will consult before any decision on all important questions of foreign policy and, in the first place, on questions of common interest, with a view to reaching as far as possible an analogous position. This consultation will bear among others on the following subjects:

Problems relating to the European Communities and to European political cooperation,

East-West relations both on the political and economic planes,

Matters dealt with within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the various international organizations in which the two Governments are interested, notably the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations and its specialized institutions.

2. The collaboration already established in the field of information will be continued and developed between the interested services in Paris and Bonn and between missions in third countries.

3. With regard to aid to developing countries, the two Governments will systematically compare their programs with a view to maintaining close coordination. They will study the possibility of undertaking joint projects. Several ministerial departments being competent for these questions, on the French side as on the German side, it will be for the two Foreign Ministers to determine together the practical bases of this collaboration.

4. The two Governments will study jointly the means of reinforcing their cooperation in other important sectors of economic policy, such as agricultural and forestry policy, energy, the problems of communications and

transport and industrial development, within the framework of the Common Market, as well as the policy of export credits.

DEFENSE

The objects pursued in this field will be the following:

1. In the field of strategy and tactics the competent authorities of the two countries will endeavor to bring their doctrines closer together with a view to reaching common conceptions. Franco-German institutes of operational research will be set up.

2. Exchanges of personnel between the armies will be increased. They will concern in particular instructors and students of the general staff colleges. They can include the temporary detachment of entire units. In order to facilitate these exchanges an effort will be made by both sides with a view to the practical teaching of the languages to the trainees.

3. With regard to armaments the two Governments will endeavor to organize work in common from the stage of drawing up appropriate armament plans and of the preparation of plans of financing them.

To this end mixed commissions will study current researches on these plans in the two countries and will carry out a comparative examination of them. They will present proposals to the ministries who will examine them at their quarterly meetings and will give the necessary directives for application.

4. The governments will institute a study of the conditions in which Franco-German collaboration can be established in the field of civil defense.

EDUCATION AND YOUTH

As regards education and youth, the proposals contained in the French and Germany memoranda of 19 September and 8 November, 1962, will be studied on the lines set out above.

1. In the field of education efforts will be concentrated mainly on the following points:

Language teaching:

The two Governments recognize the vital importance that knowledge of each other's

language in each of the two countries holds for Franco-German cooperation. They will strive, with this aim in mind, to take concrete steps to increase the number of German school children learning French and the number of French school children learning German.

The Federal Government will examine with the Governments of the Laender [states] who are responsible in this sphere, the possibility of introducing a system which will permit achievement of this aim.

In all establishments of higher learning it will be of advantage to arrange practical instruction of the French language in Germany and of the German language in France, open to all students.

The competent authorities in both countries will be asked to speed up the adoption of arrangements insuring that terms of study, examinations, university awards and diplomas correspond.

COOPERATION ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

1. Research organizations and scientific institutions will develop their contacts beginning with the fullest possible exchange of information. Coordinated research programs will be set up in disciplines where this is feasible.

2. Young people in the two countries will be given every opportunity to strengthen the bonds which link them and to increase mutual cooperation. In particular, collective exchanges will be increased.

A body for developing these opportunities and promoting the exchanges will be set up by the two countries with a single administrative council in charge. This organization will have at its disposal a joint Franco-German fund to be used for exchanges between the two countries of school children, students, young artisans and workers.

FINAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The necessary directives will be issued in each country to implement immediately everything mentioned above.

2. The two Governments will keep mem-

ber Governments of the European Communities informed of the development of Franco-German cooperation.

3. Apart from those clauses covering defense, the present treaty will also apply to the Berlin Land [state] unless a declaration to the contrary is made by the Government of the German Federal Republic to the Government of the French Republic in the three months following the entry into force of the present treaty.

4. The two Governments can make those arrangements which appear necessary for the implementation of the present treaty.

5. The present treaty will enter into force as soon as each of the two Governments has informed the other that the conditions necessary for this in either country have been fulfilled.

Drawn up in Paris, on 22 January, 1963, in two copies, in French and in German. Both texts are equally valid.

The President of the French Republic.

The Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.

The French Prime Minister.

The French Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic.

Joint Declaration

General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Following the conference which was held in Paris on January 21 and 22, 1963, and at which were present, on the French side, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Armed Forces Minister and the Minister of Education; on the German side, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister and the Minister of Family and Youth,

Convinced that the reconciliation of the German people and the French people, ending a centuries-old rivalry, constitutes an historic event which profoundly transforms the relations between the two peoples,

Aware of the solidarity uniting the two peoples, as much from the point of view of

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BOOK REVIEWS

On West Europe . . .

THE FRENCH IN GERMANY, 1945–1949.

By F. ROY WILLIS. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. 308 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$6.00.)

This is an excellent book. Its scope is restricted, but within its self-imposed limits the tale is full and clear, well-documented, and told with attention to the wider context of events. Beginning with a summary of the diplomatic moves that led to France's acquisition of a zone of occupation in Germany, it goes on to tell how French opposition to the allies' original intention of treating Germany as a whole brought about the virtual autonomy of the separate zones, and made sure "that the future trial of strength between Russia and the Western powers would have as its battlefield a divided rather than a unified Germany." If Germany still stands divided, perhaps we have the French to thank for it.

The French were determined to prevent German resurgence, to exploit the German economy, and to impose their own solution of German problems on allies with far greater power and far different ideas. Their weak economic position, their chaotic internal politics, the development of the cold war, would lead them in time to swap their stubborn stand for a tripartite solution, and accept the new Federal Republic in exchange for American (Marshall) aid.

Roy Willis goes into the details of the occupation regime, the brief but fascinating reign of De Lattre de Tassigny, the influx of businessmen and of Vichy-minded administrators, the extravagance and waste of the occupants and especially the military

(but has he ever enjoyed the delights of colonial living as a member of *any* occupation force?), the grumbles and suspicions all this evoked in France (where people did not live so well, and had to console themselves with their superior virtue), the reparation (exploitation), denazification and re-education policies and, finally, the redevelopment of representative institutions, culminating in September, 1949, with the end of military occupation.

Halting and awkward as all this was, it seems to have worked. The French certainly squeezed the Germans hard, but they had been bled white themselves; they were harsher than the British and less efficient than the Americans, but they were also more human—even in their brutality, even in their sloppiness. In the end, the bitter enemies laid the foundation for friendship, educated the younger generation towards a common European point of view, and fumbled their way towards the present alliance.

Professor Willis, for his part, never fumbles. He has given us a competent and useful account of a fascinating period. But, really, do not let us pretend that French North African troops, especially *goumiers*, were ever anything but horrid when out of the line.

FRANCE AND HER EASTERN ALLIES, 1919–1925. French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno. By PIOTR S. WANDYCZ. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. 454 pages, bibliography, maps and index, \$8.50.)

When the First World War drew to a weary end, France's satirical weekly, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, headlined simply

"Ouf!" The long, murderous drag was over. But another was just beginning. Germany's collapse, as Professor Wandycz remarks, could not change the fact that there were still 20 million more Germans than Frenchmen. And now that the Russian ally was gone, France was faced with the task of replacing it with some other alliance which could balance her neighbor's might and help check Germany in the East.

It is the story of this endeavor, in the years between 1919 and 1925, that Mr. Wandycz tells, clearly, soberly, and in detail, using material from a variety of sources, and filling a useful chink in the armor of our knowledge.

After Versailles, and *faute de mieux*, Poland and Czechoslovakia were France's only formal allies in Eastern Europe; but they were not the allies of one another (far from it, as 1938 would show). While they relied on France to defend them, the French in turn relied on them to divert German attention and block German ambitions. This fundamental divergence of interests would appear in 1925, when the Treaty of Locarno set the seal on France's decision to pass from an offensive to a defensive policy in Europe. Locarno created an illusion of security in the West, but limited French freedom of intervention against Germany, even in support of her Eastern allies, and made nonsense of the painfully built and much vaunted collective security structure based on the peace treaties and the will to preserve them.

When Paul Painlevé, prime minister in 1925, declared that the first condition of a stable peace was the security of France herself, he implicitly stated a position that the rabid nationalist, Charles Maurras, would express explicitly in 1938, when he claimed that Czech integrity was no French concern, in 1939 when he argued that—even overrun—Poland's interests were best served by France's safety, and in 1940 when he began to trumpet "France, France alone." *Sacro egoismo* has always been the ultimate rule of diplomacy. But

the policy of throwing one's friends to the wolves does not always pay. Nor, as Mr. Wandycz shows, does the determined attempt to avoid reality, and to negotiate from weakness as if it were from strength.

THE LIFE OF JEAN JAURÈS. By HARVEY GOLDBERG. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. 590 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$12.00.)

Queer creatures have lurked and linger still in the stinking marshes of French politics. Occasionally though, a man—a real one—of character and courage turns up to match his deeds to words and sow a brief seed of hope, before he dies or is eliminated by the discrimination of the democratic electorate.

Such a man was Jaurès, and Harvey Goldberg has written a book worthy of him: big, rich, rumbling, learned and articulate.

This is not only the biography of a great and attractive political figure around whom the slivered fragments of French socialism briefly united: it is the political history of France during the first and more hopeful part of the Third Republic, the history of its intellectual and social changes, and of its moral problems. Professor Goldberg avoids the obscure allusions which are the pitfall of specialists. He gives us the background of events; and, when he mentions a strike, a crisis or a debate, he lingers to describe the issues, to connect the particular with the general picture, and to give us admirable thumbnail sketches of the cast.

The scene soon gets crowded and the plot multifarious, but the dominant character remains "the stocky giant" from the Tarn—the blond scholarship winner, the hearty eater and talker and debater, the enthusiastic teacher, the middle-class husband and father, the intellectual bohemian who could sway crowds 'twixt sentiment and logic, the moral idealist who entered politics a moderate republican

only to become a symbol of revolutionary and anti-patriotic subversion, the Socialist whose deep human concerns combined with the art of the possible to create a tribune more loved and hated than any other Frenchman on the eve of the first world war. He fell on the last warm night of July and peace, shot in the back by a young fool who thought he was removing the foremost threat to French security; and, before the murderer himself went free, his crazed act was buried under four years of equally stupid carnage for equally patriotic ends.

While Professor Goldberg has given us what will remain for a long time the definitive political biography, there is a great deal more one wants to hear about the private person: about his marriage with the dull Louise—the prosperous cheesemonger's daughter; about the arguments that must have torn the anti-clerical Socialist from his conformist provincial relatives; about the fate of his family and the vagaries of his posthumous reputation.

THE MEMOIRS OF ANTHONY EDEN EARL OF AVON. FACING THE DICTATORS, 1923–1938. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962. 746 pages, appendices, maps and index, \$7.50.)

Other animals beside men have speech, of sorts; but man alone uses speech to say nothing in particular. This is one of his distinctive characteristics. And, among men, those who excel in this art have long been known as diplomats. Mr. Eden was a diplomat, and the Earl of Avon remains one still.

Obviously, this is a book that must be read by students of politics, international and English, between the wars. But it cannot be read alone, or for the sake of novelty. Though he allows himself mild sarcasm, Lord Avon is discreet. He tells us what we know, but little that we did not. Elected to the Commons at 26 (in 1923), he became Britain's youngest Foreign Secretary twelve years later, replac-

ing Sir Samuel Hoare after the blunder of the Hoare-Laval proposals. As Eden took office, just before Christmas, 1935, King George V confessed: "I said to your predecessor: 'You know what they're all saying, no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris.' The fellow didn't even laugh."

The reader, too, finds little to laugh about in the succeeding pages. We read again the depressing tale of democratic spinelessness before dictators' bluff; of Hitler's "brazen but skilful methods," succeeding despite the clumsy pusillanimity of Western powers; of France and Britain trying to shunt responsibility for German reoccupation of the Rhineland, their only trace of firmness appearing in determination to whine loudly and leave all sticks at home; of Chamberlain (and his sister-in-law too) privately outflanking the Foreign Secretary in eagerness to conciliate Mussolini; of Blum and Baldwin rushing to proclaim non-intervention in Spain, sure that their pious example would keep the carnivores in line. In this connection, the author's contention that the initiative for non-intervention came from Blum contradicts statements from men like Vincent Auriol that British pressure played an important part in Blum's reluctant decision. And then, in 1938, we see Eden resign, because his Italian policy differed from that of his leader, Neville Chamberlain, who was firmly convinced that appeasement could secure the peace.

Eden resigned, but took good care not to speak too loud. Compared with Duff-Cooper's resignation speech after Munich, his statement had a muffled sound. The reward would come first in growing public sympathy for the discreet victim that he made, then in his recovery of the Foreign Office, lastly in the premiership. Perhaps all were deserved: the Eden myth was not. If we admit that Eden reflected some of what was best in England between the wars we should, alas, not say much for either.

EUGEN WEBER

University of California, Los Angeles.

GERMANY IN WORLD POLITICS

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cratic West. With growing anti-authoritarian vigor and vitality in the German Federal Republic there exist good prospects that the post-Adenauer era will broaden the basis of democracy, will help to make the German Federal Republic a stabilizing factor in European and world politics by its faithfulness to the North Atlantic community and by its constructive and no longer backward-looking Eastern policy. This will diminish the surviving fears of German "militarism" and expansionism.¹²

¹² A constructive Eastern policy on the part of the German Federal Republic will be helped by the removal of Walter Ulbricht, now 70 years old, from his entrenched dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht is at heart an arch-Stalinist who, as long as he dared, opposed Khrushchev and upheld Molotov and Stalinism. His successor may be "relatively" as "liberal" as Khrushchev is compared to Stalin, Gomulka compared to Bierut or even Kadar compared to Rakosi. See Martin Jänicke, *Es geht nur ohne Ulbricht*, *Der Monat*, January, 1963, pp. 90-96.

GERMANY AND EAST EUROPE

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It is obvious that for domestic and electioneering reasons in the near future it would be difficult for any German government to recognize openly and officially the existing frontiers. The only thing it could do is to let the explosive issue slumber quietly under the camouflage of noncommittal statements and not encourage revisionist propaganda. Whether everything possible has been done in this respect is open to question. For instance, on September 2, 1962, the new German Defense Minister Kai Uwe von Hassel made a speech at the annual meeting organized by the Association of Expellees and Refugees. Von Hassel expressed the opinion that some sort of Polish-German reconciliation would be highly desirable. He stressed that the "problem of reunification is closely con-

nected with the question of those [Oder-Neisse] territories," and declared:

Giving up those lands would not facilitate reunification, and reunification without them would not contribute in any substantial degree to the improvement of German-Polish relations.

To what extent he spoke for the record, to retain the allegiance of the still considerable mass of refugees, nobody can tell. There is no doubt, however, that the facts of everyday life are against any revision of the existing frontiers, that the refugees are swimming against the current. Moreover, even if one assumes that the Oder-Neisse lands could be peacefully returned to Germany in the near future, what would the Germans do with them? Who would settle them? East Germany is an underpopulated country because of the flight of some three million people to the West. The Federal Republic has successfully absorbed some 12 million refugees from East Europe and now is suffering from an acute labor shortage; it annually attracts some 800,000 workers from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey. Many economists argue that the very influx of refugees, providing additional skillful manpower, was one of the secrets of the "economic miracle."

Although the short-run perspectives are perhaps not too bright for some sort of settlement of this explosive issue, the long-range prospects seem to be mildly encouraging, barring unforeseen circumstances. Bonn's East European policy has been slow in developing but deep and hitherto ignored currents seem to shape its future course.

GERMANY AND WEST EUROPE

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bers of the Common Market. Indeed, it is far from accepted within Germany. Its exclusiveness, combined with the strong anti-British and anti-American bias manifested by General de Gaulle, has given rise to considerable concern. German politicians, and indeed the German public, do not want to be

put in the position of having to choose between France and the United States.

In any event, at this writing the Treaty has not been ratified. Despite serious opposition, it would be unwise for the other members of the Western alliance to count on its rejection by the Bundestag. Adenauer has outmaneuvered his opponents before, and in a matter such as this, which he deems so important, all his parliamentary skill will be brought to bear. If the Bundestag does reject the Treaty his era of political dominance will have closed, and the spectre of a Gaullist Europe will begin to recede from the horizon.

Whatever view one may hold of German foreign policy, there is little doubt that it has succeeded in one of its basic objectives, namely to become an integral part of the Western coalition. With its economic strength and growing military power it is probably safe to characterize Germany as the strongest continental power in Nato, although this status may be altered when France obtains an operational nuclear capability.

Various commentators⁹ profess to fear this German strength. In the light of Germany's record such fears can serve as a necessary corrective to the uncritical adulation of Germany as a bastion against communism so often expressed by our press and politicians. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that Europe is still a decisive theatre of the East-West struggle, and that in that struggle the Federal Republic constitutes a major Western asset. United States policy is still tied to Nato, for the very good reason that no valid alternatives have as yet been elaborated, and in truth it is difficult to imagine Nato without West German participation. If Germany's pivotal position gave her too much influence on American policy in the past, which in itself is debatable, there is very good evidence that this is no longer the case.

The real problem is that some future West German government may seek some form of accommodation with East Germany or with the Soviet Union in order to bring about reunification. All the more reason, therefore, for this country and the Western alliance to

direct German energies to development of a true European political community, in which Germany can play a meaningful and vital role.

⁹ See, for example, Fred Warner Neal in his recent book, *War and Peace and Germany*.

WEST GERMAN PRESS

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excess of the number of copies sold; they, too, cover a wide range of timely topics.

The illustrated weeklies appeal to a different class of readers, primarily those who want to be entertained rather than enlightened. However, some of these journals possess a considerable influence on the masses because of the topics selected for detailed coverage. *Der Stern* and *Revue*, each with a circulation of about 1.5 million, are the most successful weeklies in this group, but there is a host of somewhat smaller illustrated journals, the best of which was probably the *Frankfurter Illustrierte*. Several steps below them rank those weeklies which cater to uninhibited sensationalism. They have an amazingly wide distribution. Obviously there are only too many people who want to know all about the marriage of Princess Margaret, the love life of Soraya, former wife of the Shah of Iran, and the hopes of Queen Fabiola for an heir to the Belgian throne. While the illustrated journals flourish, the art of the cartoonist is not very far developed. The revived *Simplicissimus* contains probably the best social and political satire, but does not measure up to its great traditions of the early twentieth century.

The Federal Republic has a well developed network of radio stations. These give the public a goodly mixture of news, cultural programs and entertainment. Television has also made rapid progress. There are many homes in which the hostess gently turns on the television set when the after-dinner conversation is fading. On Saturday or Sunday afternoons the sports fans watch the great events on the screen. All told, 6,500,000 tele-

vision sets are in use. But neither radio nor television has displaced the German newspaper. On the contrary, nationwide circulation statistics indicate that today one-quarter more papers are sold than were sold in 1955. According to figures recently published in *Die Deutsche Rundschau*, 86 per cent of all citizens read a newspaper at least once a week. All this shows that the press today is well entrenched in the Bonn republic. It should play an ever increasing role in the growth of a democratic spirit among the Germans.

ECONOMIC MIRACLE

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French, Dutch, and Italian agriculture will almost certainly put increasing pressure upon the government to grant larger subsidies to its farmers.

DECLINE OF SOZIALE MARKTWIRTSCHAFT?

As the Common Market develops, appeals for more government intervention in the West German economy will probably increase. Not only agriculture, but also other segments of the economy which are adversely affected by the disappearance of tariff barriers within the Common Market will certainly request government help. What role the government will assume in the conflicts between the major domestic economic blocs is still not clear.

If inflation continues, the large elderly portion of the population and a substantial segment of the middle class (*Mittelstand*) will probably expect controls over prices and restrictions upon collective bargaining. Labor will probably continue to strive for higher real wages and may become quite favorable toward some form of price controls, but will be wary of any restrictions on collective bargaining. Business may welcome some form of wage ceilings, but probably will prefer to use trusts and cartels—both national and international—to regulate prices and markets. A recession causing any appreciable amount

of unemployment would almost certainly force the government to combat the threat to political stability.

Even without a major recession, industry's drive for markets and the effects of recent cutbacks in steel production may provoke requests for larger military expenditures (according to some estimates West Germany now produces over 80 per cent of her own armaments), or for more trade with eastern Europe. If the Common Market fails to provide a satisfactory outlet for West Germany's exports, the many advantages which it offers her industry will not counteract her incipient "overproduction." Like the United States, West Germany may soon be confronted with the problem of surplus industrial capacity.

FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY

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their security as from the point of view of their economic and cultural development,

Noting in particular that youth has recognized this solidarity and is called on to play a decisive role in the consolidation of Franco-German friendship,

Recognizing that a reinforcing of cooperation between the two countries constitutes an indispensable stage on the way to a united Europe, which is the aim of the two peoples:

Have given their agreement to the organization and principles of cooperation between the two states such as they are set out in the treaty signed on this day,

The President of the French Republic,

The Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Drawn up in Paris on January 22, 1963, in two copies, in the French language and in the German language.

ERRATUM

The Editors regret that an error appeared in the February, 1963, issue. Stanley R. Ross' title is Professor of History and Chairman of the Department, State University of New York, Long Island Center.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of February, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference

Feb. 4—President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika questions Communist motives in Africa and Asia, warning of a new colonialism.

Feb. 11—Twenty-seven resolutions are approved by 400 delegates from 60 countries attending the third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. Support for violence to end South Africa's racist policies and an economic boycott of Portugal are among the measures that have been approved.

Disarmament

Feb. 8—The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* charges that the U.S. and Britain have retreated from their earlier stand on inspection procedures for a nuclear test ban.

Feb. 11—Joseph B. Godber, Britain's chief negotiator at the 18-nation disarmament conference, says that the number of on site inspections demanded by the West to monitor a nuclear weapons test ban is "not inviolate."

The U.S.S.R. says that U.S. resumption of underground experimental nuclear explosions has "given impetus to a new nuclear arms race."

Feb. 12—The 18-nation disarmament conference resumes its meetings in Geneva; the U.S.S.R. calls for the liquidation of foreign bases.

Feb. 20—The U.S.S.R. proposes a nonaggression pact between Eastern and Western military alliances.

A Soviet delegate says that direct nego-

tiations with the U.S. and Britain on a nuclear test ban treaty are pointless until the West accepts the Russian offer to allow 2 to 3 on site inspections annually.

Feb. 25—United States delegate William Foster regrets that Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov left the conference abruptly February 23 and hopes that his absence is "temporary."

European Economic Community

Feb. 5—The head of the Executive Commission of the Common Market (E.E.C.), Walter Hallstein, attacks de Gaulle's plan for transforming Europe into a Third Force and criticizes French opposition to British entry in the Common Market.

Feb. 13—The Executive Commission reports that the Common Market's trade balance with the rest of the world worsened by some \$1.3 billion in 1962.

Feb. 19—Representatives of the 6 E.E.C. nations meet in Brussels.

Feb. 25—The Common Market's Council of Ministers begins a two-day session; Italy's decision of last week to refuse to sign the Common Market's Convention of Association with 18 African states is discussed. Italy has notified the Council that it cannot sign the Convention until a new government is named in the Italian elections scheduled for April 28.

European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.)

Feb. 18—Meeting in Geneva, E.F.T.A. ministers of the 7 member states agree that in the foreseeable future there is no possi-

bility of individual or collective agreement with the Common Market.

Feb. 19—The 7 member nations of E.F.T.A. tentatively agree to abolish all tariffs on industrial products they trade among themselves by the end of 1966; the E.F.T.A. is to be strengthened. The 7 member states are Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. Finland is an associate member.

Nordic Council

Feb. 16—At the opening meeting of the Nordic Council, Denmark asks members of the European Free Trade Association to increase their purchases of Danish farm products.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

Feb. 4—Nato Secretary General Dirk U. Stikker expresses his "good hopes" that despite De Gaulle's indifference an international nuclear force can be established to protect the North Atlantic area.

Feb. 14—It is reported by *The New York Times* (International) that the U.S. has told its Nato allies that only if they prepare their forces for a 90-day campaign can a forward defense strategy for Europe be effective.

Feb. 20—The U.S. State Department suggests that Nato nuclear forces be equipped at least initially with missile-carrying surface ships rather than Polaris-armed submarines.

Feb. 23—The U.S. State Department reveals that the U.S. and Britain have tentatively agreed on a plan to accelerate the establishment of a joint nuclear striking force for Nato.

Feb. 27—In Paris the U.S. offers a plan for establishing a European nuclear sea-based force armed with Polaris missiles.

United Nations

Feb. 2—After 18 months of unsuccessful negotiation, Joseph E. Johnson resigns as

special United Nations representative mediating the Palestine refugee problem.

Feb. 13—The U.N. Special Fund reveals plans to launch an agricultural experiment project in Cuba in spite of U.S. opposition.

Feb. 16—The U.N. Population Commission ends its 12th session; a world population conference is planned for 1965.

Feb. 19—U.N. Secretary General U Thant says that projects sponsored by the U.N.'s Special Fund should not be judged on a political basis, in commenting on U.S. opposition to plans for a project in Cuba.

ALGERIA

(See also *Morocco*)

Feb. 4—Premier Ahmed Ben Bella meets with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams in Algeria. Ben Bella tells newsmen of the importance of the U.S. emergency food program for Algerians.

Feb. 9—Commandant Si Larbi of Constantine is dismissed as a regional army commander because of his criticisms of the army's treatment of the former guerrilla fighters.

ARGENTINA

Feb. 15—It is reported that last night President Jose Maria Guido signed a decree reviving a 1956 law banning all Peronist activity. This will eliminate any public campaign by Peronists for the elections to be held in June, 1963.

BRAZIL

Feb. 22—The Brazilian ambassador in Paris asks to be allowed to deliver a note to President de Gaulle from Brazilian President João Goulart on the "lobster war." Brazil has ordered French lobster boats to withdraw beyond the continental shelf. France refuses to recognize Brazilian sovereignty beyond the 3-mile limit. It is reported that France has sent a ship to escort the lobster boats.

Feb. 25—A French Navy spokesman declares

that the naval destroyer escorting French lobster boats off the coast of Brazil has been withdrawn.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 4—Minister of Defense Douglas Harness resigns from the cabinet in protest over the refusal of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker to accept nuclear arms for Canadian forces. The U.S. State Department statement on Canadian policy has precipitated a government crisis.

Feb. 5—The Social Credit party and the New Democrats vote with the Liberals to oust Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's minority Conservative government; the vote is 142 to 111.

Feb. 6—The Canadian Parliament is dissolved. National elections are scheduled for April 8.

Feb. 9—Minister of Trade and Commerce George Hess and Pierre Sevigny, Acting Minister of Defense, resign from the cabinet because of Diefenbaker's anti-Americanism and his opposition to nuclear arms for Canadian forces. Minister of Justice E. Davie Fulton resigned before the recent crisis to become leader of the provincial Conservative party in British Columbia.

Feb. 11—Diefenbaker names new members for the "Caretaker cabinet" to replace those members who have resigned.

Feb. 23—Diefenbaker arrives in London for consultations.

Ceylon

Feb. 8—After an emergency Cabinet meeting, the Government ends negotiations for a "lump sum settlement" of American oil companies' claims for their expropriated property. The Government is reacting to the U.S. suspension of foreign aid to Ceylon. (See also *U. S. Foreign Policy*, Feb. 1.)

Great Britain

Feb. 1—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan

arrives in Rome for a 2-day official visit. Feb. 3—Macmillan returns to London with a pledge that Italy will aid in the revival of the dormant Western European Union.

Feb. 4—Two newspaper reporters are sentenced to prison for refusing to tell the Vassall Spy Tribunal and, later, a court, where they received their information about the Vassall case. Vassall, a clerk in the Admiralty, was sentenced in 1962 to 18 years in prison for spying for the U.S.S.R.

Minister of Labor John Hare tells Commons that unemployment will increase because of the winter weather; unemployment has reached a 16-year high with 814,000 out of work at the end of 1962.

Feb. 11—Macmillan tells Commons that Princess Margaret's Paris visit has been cancelled as a political protest against de Gaulle's veto of British entry into the Common Market.

Feb. 14—Harold Wilson succeeds the late Hugh Gaitskell as leader of the Labor party, defeating George Brown.

Feb. 20—A Government White Paper on defense reveals the development of a "nuclear weapon."

India

Feb. 10—Negotiators disclose that talks on Kashmir will be continued from March 9 through March 12 in Calcutta. The third round of talks is concluding.

Feb. 21—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tells Parliament that "in the event of a sudden emergency" the Government will utilize whatever aid friendly nations offer, but notes that Indian air defense is "too vital" to depend on an "air umbrella" such as has been suggested the Western allies might supply.

Feb. 25—Nehru tells Parliament that India will not recognize the border agreement to be signed by Communist China and Pakistan fixing the frontier between northern (Pakistani) Kashmir and Sinkiang. He terms the agreement "objectionable" and its timing "extraordinary."

Feb. 27—Nehru tells Parliament the govern-

ment is willing to submit the Chinese border dispute to arbitration "by a number of countries."

Pakistan

Feb. 11—The Indian delegation to the Pakistani-Indian talks on Kashmir returns to New Delhi; a communiqué reveals the date of the next round of conferences, March 9-12.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Feb. 1—Hastings Kamuzu Banda becomes the first prime minister of the self-governing country of Nyasaland.

Feb. 2—British First Secretary of State R. A. Butler expresses optimism about some form of association between the federal territories as he leaves for London.

Kenya

Feb. 15—Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, promises to "clear the decks" for general elections in Kenya "at the first possible moment."

BULGARIA

Feb. 13—It is reported that African students in Bulgaria have demonstrated against the government's suppression of an all-African students' union.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Feb. 8—A Peking Radio broadcast last night charged that Indian troops have violated the ceasefire; it is charged that Indian troops have crossed "over the line of actual control." (See also *British Commonwealth, India*.)

Feb. 23—A Vice Premier and Chief of Staff of the Chinese Peoples Army, General Lo Jui Ching, speaks at a party in Peking given by the Soviet military attaché to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the Soviet

army. General Lo urges that the Soviet Union and China strengthen their "unity of armies and peoples" to meet the threat of the common enemy, the U.S. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 27—In an editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (official organ of the Chinese Communist party) the Soviet Union is harshly criticized for supplying planes to India and for having stopped economic and military aid to China in 1960. It is reported that political experts following the Sino-Soviet conflict consider the editorial to indicate the sharp tensions between the 2 states.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Feb. 5—Katanga President Moise Tshombe announces that he will leave the Congo to seek treatment for an eye disease. In his absence, former Katanganese Foreign Minister Evariste Kimba will be acting provincial president. Tshombe also states at his press conference that U Thant's plan for the Congo has been implemented by Katanga.

Feb. 6—Some 23 Katanganese army officers swear allegiance to the central Congo government at a ceremony in Leopoldville. The head of Katanga's forces, General Norbert Moke, is the first to take the oath.

Feb. 8—A roadblock, set up 3 weeks ago by Central Congo provincial police, keeps farmers from taking their produce into Leopoldville. Provincial authorities wish to regain provincial control of Leopoldville, which has been established as a federal district.

Tshombe arrives in Salisbury en route to Paris.

Feb. 9—It is announced that Premier Cyrille Adoula will visit Belgium next month.

Feb. 12—A U.S. fact-finding mission, led by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Harlan Cleveland, departs after 13 days. Cleveland declares that restraining the army and halting inflation in the Congo are the two most essential measures.

Feb. 13—A Vice-Premier in the Central government, Chieftain Sendwa (formerly Tshombe's main rival in Katanga), returns to Katanga Province after an absence of more than 2 years.

Feb. 15—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams visits Leopoldville.

Feb. 18—The Central government negotiates the removal of the road block to allow farm products to be sent into Leopoldville.

Feb. 20—Premier Cyrille Adoula arrives in Elisabethville (capital of Katanga Province). He will meet with Katanga leaders to discuss the incorporation of Katanga into the Congo.

Feb. 22—It is announced that U.N. troops have quelled an uprising by Katanganese gendarmes in Kapanga in north Katanga.

Feb. 25—Premier Adoula arrives in Belgium, where he is greeted by Belgian ministers and his children.

CUBA

Feb. 19—It is reported that at a meeting with congressional leaders last night, U.S. President John F. Kennedy told them he has received assurances that several thousand Soviet troops on Cuban soil will be removed shortly. One source declares that March 15 is the deadline for removal.

Feb. 22—The U.S. sends a note to Cuba asking for an explanation of the air attack on an unarmed U.S. shrimp boat in the Caribbean 60 miles north of the Cuban mainland. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Feb. 25—A Cuban diplomatic note states that Cuban planes did not fire on an American shrimp boat.

Feb. 26—*Hsinhua* (official Communist press agency) announces that Communist China has signed an agreement with Cuba, whereby Cuba will receive a long-term loan from China. The pact also provides for trade on a number of products.

FRANCE

(See also *Brazil*.)

Feb. 4—French Ambassador to the U.S.

Hervé Alphand declares that France wishes to "preserve the alliance with America," but prefers "a cooperation among allied forces" instead of "the integration of Atlantic forces."

Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces General Charles Ailleret confers in Spain with military leaders there on closer ties between their countries.

Feb. 5—A statement by President Charles de Gaulle is released. It reveals that Britain's Polaris pact with the U.S. affected France's refusal to admit Britain to the Common Market.

Feb. 6—It is disclosed that the Soviet Union yesterday delivered a note to the French ambassador in Moscow, warning France against outfitting West Germany with a nuclear striking force. The U.S.S.R. warns that such a step is a "direct threat."

Feb. 15—A plot to assassinate de Gaulle is unearthed. The plotters are arrested.

Feb. 26—Colonel Antoine Argoud (one of the important leaders of the secret army organization which opposed Algerian independence) is found by police after a phone call tip from Argoud's colleagues. Argoud declares that he was kidnapped in Munich, Germany. He is under a death sentence because of his role in the military revolt in April, 1961.

Feb. 27—Argoud is indicted for his terrorist activities against the French state.

The French Cabinet moves to restrict credit and increase food imports. In an attempt to head off the coal workers strike scheduled for March 1, the Cabinet warns that striking workers will be ordered to stay at their jobs under threat of imprisonment or fines.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Feb. 27—The Communist party's Politburo announces that it has reformed its organization. The Politburo will have a separate bureau for agriculture, and another for industry and construction, to provide for better supervision of the economy.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Feb. 1—Christian Democratic parliamentary leader Heinrich von Brentano declares that “there is no Bonn-Paris axis,” in an attempt to emphasize that the treaty with France will not weaken Bonn’s relations with the U.S.

Feb. 5—In an interview published in the Munich newspaper *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, Vice Chancellor and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard criticizes Adenauer’s policy of close cooperation with France. He declares that he is “ready to accept a call to the chancellorship. . . .”

Feb. 6—In a state of the nation message, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer tells the Bundestag (lower house) that West Germany will maintain close ties with the U.S. He declares that the treaty with France does not conflict with Bonn’s “ultimate dependence on the U.S.”

Feb. 7—Adenauer declares that President de Gaulle promised that British entry into the Common Market would be the first matter discussed under the new Franco-German treaty. Adenauer declares that he favors British entry.

Feb. 17—In West Berlin, the Social Democratic party led by Mayor Willy Brandt receives 85 seats in the election to the 134-member city parliament. The Christian Democratic Union and the Socialist Unity (Communist) party lose support.

INDONESIA

Feb. 14—It is reported that last night President Sukarno announced that Indonesia is opposed to the British sponsored Federation of Malaysia consisting of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. He voices his support for the rebel troops in British Borneo.

IRAN

Feb. 5—Premier Adollah Alam declares that parliamentary elections will be held within 5 months.

IRAQ

Feb. 3—It is reported that Premier Abdel Karim Kassim recently tried to settle differences with the Kurds and the Iraq Petroleum Company. The Kurds, in rebellion since 1961, have been offered an extended period of amnesty until March 1 and the possibility of negotiations to settle their demands. The Iraq Petroleum Company has also been offered arbitration on the most important points in dispute.

Feb. 8—A coup d’état led by the air force overthrows the government of Premier Abdel Karim Kassim. An announcement on the Baghdad Radio is issued by the National Revolutionary Council, declaring that Kassim is dead.

Feb. 9—Permanent Representative to the U.N. Adnan M. Pachachi declares that he has informed U. N. Secretary General U Thant that the new government is in control and will assume the international obligations of the Kassim regime.

The Baghdad Radio announces that Kassim and three others have been executed by firing squad.

It is reported that last night a Nasserite, Colonel Abdel-Salam Arif, was appointed provisional president.

Major General Ahmed Hassan Elbaker (Nasserite) is named premier. A 21-man Cabinet is also organized.

Feb. 14—President Arif discloses that he was among the conspirators plotting against Kassim.

Feb. 16—Fighting between Iraqi army troops and the Communists continues. The government rounds up Communists and sends them to concentration camps. Minister of State Kazem Jawad declares that the new government intends “to crush absolutely the Communist party.”

Feb. 19—A Kurdish delegation arrives in Baghdad to discuss settling the Kurdish problem with the revolutionary government.

Feb. 25—An Iraqi mission in Cairo departs. The mission, headed by Deputy Premier Ali Sallah Elsaadi, includes the Iraqi

foreign minister and defense minister. They confer with President Nasser on renewing the mutual aid pact of 1958.

ISRAEL

Feb. 20—The Knesset (parliament) defeats 3 key motions to abolish the military government over the Arab minority in Israel. Premier David Ben-Gurion threatened to resign if the motions were approved.

ITALY

Feb. 2—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan confers with Premier Amintore Fanfani in Rome.

Feb. 18—The Italian Cabinet meets. It schedules parliamentary elections for April 28. Earlier, President Antonio Segni signed a decree dissolving parliament.

LAOS

Feb. 21—King Savang Vatthana begins a weekend visit in New York. He confers with U.N. Secretary General U Thant.

MOROCCO

Feb. 8—The National Press Union urges the government to suppress the two leading newspapers in Morocco, owned by a French businessman.

Feb. 11—A meeting of the North African leaders from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia opens in Rabat.

Feb. 14—The meeting of Ahmed Balafrej of Morocco, Mohammed Khemisti of Algeria and Mongi Slim of Tunisia ends. Algeria and Tunisia agree to resume negotiations ruptured last month.

NICARAGUA

Feb. 3—Elections for the presidency are held. The candidate selected by retiring President Luis Somoza is Rene Schick. He is opposed by Diego Chamorro.

Feb. 6—It is reported that Schick is leading and that Chamorro has conceded.

PARAGUAY

Feb. 10—Elections for the presidency are held. There is only token opposition by one candidate to President Alfred Stroessner, who has held office since 1955.

POLAND

Feb. 2—It is reported that yesterday the U.S. and Poland signed an agreement whereby the U.S. will sell Poland wheat, cotton and tobacco. Poland will repay the U.S. in dollars for any part of the zlotys not spent by the U.S. in 10 years.

Feb. 18—A government order restricts further the freedom of the press. Henceforth all persons seeking information from state agencies must put their questions in writing and give the purpose for which the information is solicited.

SPAIN

Feb. 3—Chief of Staff of the French armed forces Charles Ailleret arrives in Madrid to negotiate closer military ties.

Feb. 14—Generalissimo Francisco Franco schedules a meeting of the 150-member national council of the Falange movement on March 9.

SYRIA

Feb. 5—Syrian troops in armored cars search a Lebanese frontier village in their efforts to unearth Nasserite infiltrators.

TUNISIA

(See *Morocco*.)

U.S.S.R., THE

Feb. 1—The Soviet Union and France sign a trade agreement to increase their trade by about one-third during 1963-1965.

Feb. 2—The twentieth anniversary of the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad is given prominence in Soviet newspapers. Articles credit Premier Khrushchev for his role then.

Feb. 5—In notes to the French and West

German ambassadors to Moscow, the Soviet Union protests the treaty of cooperation signed last month by France and West Germany.

Feb. 7—Premier Georges Pompidou decides to eliminate a talk by Premier Khrushchev taped for French television viewers as part of an hour-long program on the battle of Stalingrad. The telecast is cancelled after the Soviet Union warns that the film must either be used as it stands or be dropped.

Pravda (Communist party newspaper) publishes an article offering trade to Britain. The offer appears on the eve of a visit by 170 British businessmen.

Feb. 10—*Pravda* publishes an editorial stating its willingness to meet at any time with the Chinese Communists to discuss ideological differences.

Feb. 12—The Soviet Union orders the National Broadcasting Company (U.S.) to close its news bureau in Moscow. The action is partly inspired because of a U.S. television show entitled "The Rise of Khrushchev."

Feb. 13—*Izvestia* (Soviet government newspaper) publishes an article praising the Sino-Soviet military treaty, on the eve of its thirteenth anniversary.

Feb. 15—At a reception for Laotian King Savang Vatthana in Moscow, Premier Khrushchev embraces the Chinese Communist Ambassador, Pan Tzu Li.

Feb. 22—Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Soviet defense minister, declares that if the U.S. attacks Cuba, the Soviet Union will come to Cuba's aid. He speaks at the 45th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy.

It is reported that at a party meeting yesterday in Tselinograd (Virgin Lands City) presided over by Frol R. Kozlov (member of the national party presidium) Tikhon I. Sokolov, in charge of the wheat growing virgin lands area on the Kazakh Republic, is accused of "serious errors." He is replaced by Fyodor S. Kolomiyets.

Feb. 23—It is reported that *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* has published the first complete list

of the new industrial regions under Khrushchev's reorganization of the economic administration in November, 1962. The list reveals that there are only 47 independent economic regions compared with about 100 formerly.

Feb. 26—In a communiqué released today, it is disclosed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed on a cultural exchange of a puppet theater and circus from each country.

Feb. 27—Khrushchev, speaking at a rally in the Kalinin Electoral District of Moscow where he is running for re-election to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, is hopeful that the ideological dispute with China can be settled.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Feb. 20—It is disclosed that U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser will order the removal shortly of the 20,000 U.A.R. troops in Yemen. (See also *Yemen*.)

Feb. 21—Nasser tells a Cairo crowd that Iraq and the U.A.R. now share a "unity of objective." (See also *Iraq*, Feb. 25.)

UNITED STATES

Foreign Policy

Feb. 1—Secretary of State Dean Rusk reveals that the U.S. has indefinitely extended its deadline for stopping foreign aid for Ceylon; the deadline was originally to be February 1 unless the government of Ceylon compensated two American oil companies for expropriated property. (See also *British Commonwealth, Ceylon*.)

Dean Rusk apologizes for the tone of a State Department statement criticizing Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. (See also *British Commonwealth, Canada*.)

Feb. 2—The White House reveals that the President will appoint Archibald S. Alexander as Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Feb. 4—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer confers with U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling before Dowling returns

to Washington for consultation.

Dean Rusk explains the State Department's role in the argument with Canada over nuclear defenses to a closed session of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Canadian Affairs. A State Department statement has precipitated a cabinet crisis in Canada.

Feb. 6—Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatrick arrives in Tokyo to talk to Japanese officials.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara shows intelligence photographs to assure the American people that all Soviet offensive weapons were removed from Cuba last fall "beyond any reasonable doubt."

The President issues an order denying government-financed cargoes to foreign merchant vessels trading with Cuba.

Feb. 7—President Kennedy says that Soviet forces in Cuba constitute "unfinished business" with the U.S.S.R. but are not an offensive threat to the Western hemisphere.

Feb. 8—The U.S. suspends over \$3 million in economic aid to Ceylon.

Feb. 11—The U.S. recognizes the new government of Iraq after consultation with Great Britain.

Feb. 13—Dean Rusk reaffirms the U.S. position that "Cuba will not become a base for offensive military operations against other countries of this hemisphere."

Feb. 14—President Kennedy pledges that U.S. troops will remain in Europe as long as the Western alliance wants them to remain.

Feb. 20—Cuban-based MIG fighter planes fire rockets near a U.S. shrimp boat in international waters between Florida and Cuba.

Feb. 21—President Kennedy orders the armed forces to take "all necessary action against repetition" of the incident involving an American shrimp boat. The shrimp boat was unmarked. The American charge is denied by Cuba.

Feb. 22—The U.S. demands a full explanation from Cuba for the jet fighter "attack" on an unmarked American shrimp boat

February 20. (See also *Cuba*.)

Feb. 27—Kai-Uwe Von Hassel, new Defense Minister of West Germany, calls on President Kennedy.

Feb. 28—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara warns the U.S. will not tolerate Soviet combat operations in Cuba.

Government

Feb. 1—The government-chartered private communication satellite corporation to own and operate the global space system files articles of incorporation in Washington.

Feb. 7—President Kennedy sends Congress a program for improving the nation's health, including medical insurance for the aged and federal aid to improve health facilities and relieve manpower shortages.

The President reveals he intends to reappoint William McChesney Martin, Jr., as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Liberals in the Senate abandon their effort to strengthen the anti-filibuster rule by allowing the closing off of debate by a vote of three-fifths of those present instead of two-thirds of those present and voting.

Feb. 8—A federal grand jury indicts Igor Cassini, international publicity agent, for "willfully and unlawfully" failing to register as an agent for former Dominican Republic dictator Trujillo.

Feb. 12—The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issues a 246-page report concluding that "the last battle for equal rights" for the Negro may be fought in the North.

Feb. 14—The President asks Congress to establish two types of work corps aimed at problems of youth unemployment and suggests expansion of the peace corps.

Feb. 18—The President meets with congressional leaders of both parties to discuss "a number of matters" concerning foreign policy.

Feb. 21—President Kennedy asks Congress for a program totaling almost \$10 billion for medical care and other services for the nation's older citizens. The new program is to be known as "hospital insurance."

Feb. 22—The President reveals that awards

of the medals of freedom will become a civil honors system with a new award to be known as the presidential medal of freedom for those "who contribute significantly to the quality of American life." The medal of freedom has so far been awarded only 24 times.

Feb. 25—The Senate refuses to enlarge the Finance Committee and the Appropriations Committee in order to add new committee members more amenable to the Kennedy administration's programs.

The President tells the American Bankers Association that "nothing should stand in the way" of a major tax reduction, not even legislation for tax reform.

Feb. 26—*The New York Times* reports that Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk has resigned to become president and principal operating officer of the new space communications corporation.

Feb. 27—It is disclosed in Washington that Leo D. Welch, chairman of the board of the Standard Oil Company of N.J., will become board chairman and chief executive officer of the communications satellite corporation.

Feb. 28—The President asks Congress for unprecedented authority to protect Negro voting rights.

Labor

Feb. 2—The Philadelphia Transportation Company strike ends after 19 days when a new 2-year contract is signed. A 33 cents-an-hour wage increase in basic operating wages is provided.

Feb. 17—New York Typographical Union Number 6 unanimously approves Bertram Powers' handling of the newspaper strike. Powers is president of the striking union.

Feb. 18—The Executive Council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. begins its midwinter sessions at Bal Harbour, Florida.

Feb. 19—W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, declares that the New York and Cleveland newspaper strikes should be submitted to some sort of independent determination.

Feb. 21—President Kennedy asks the New York newspaper publishers and strikers to submit their dispute to "independent determination."

Feb. 26—The Southern Pacific Company secures a temporary restraining order 6 hours before a strike deadline scheduled by the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks.

Feb. 28—The *New York Post* reveals that it will resume publication, breaking the unified stand taken by the Publishers Association of New York against the striking union.

Military

Feb. 1—Secretary of State Dean Rusk reveals that the President is ordering resumption of preparations for underground nuclear testing in the light of the failure of the 3-nation conference on a nuclear test ban.

Feb. 14—Radio contact with a Syncom Communication satellite fails; the satellite was launched into a "stationary orbit" traveling at the speed of the earth's rotation.

Feb. 26—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration reports that temperatures at or near the surface of Venus are about 800 degrees fahrenheit, ruling out the possibility of life in any form resembling that found on earth i.e., life based on the existence of water. The Venus temperatures were reported by the Mariner Space probe. No magnetic field was recorded.

Politics

Feb. 17—Robert Gaston, who claims personal support from the western states in the John Birch Society, is elected president of the volunteer and unofficial Young Republicans of California.

Segregation

Feb. 8—The Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi ask for a jury trial on the charges of criminal contempt against them stemming from the University of Mississippi riots of last fall.

Feb. 27—*The New York Times* reports that the Kennedy administration has in effect accepted a "salt and pepper" desegregation system for six military installations; children of military personnel may choose segregated or desegregated schools. Civil rights leaders protest.

Supreme Court

Feb. 18—The Court rules 5 to 4 that 2 expatriation statutes depriving an American of citizenship if he leaves the country to avoid military service are unconstitutional; such legislation imposes punishment without the safeguards of a criminal trial. The statutes at issue were passed in 1944 and 1952.

The Court rules 8 to 1 that the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth acted unconstitutionally when it threatened periodical distributors with criminal proceedings if they did not stop distributing materials the Commission listed as objectionable. The 9-member commission was established by the Rhode Island legislature in 1956.

The Court rules unanimously that United States labor laws do not apply to foreign flag ships even if they are American-owned.

Feb. 25—The Court rules 8 to 1 to reverse the convictions of 187 Negro students who protested segregation by a protest march around the South Carolina state house March 2, 1961. The conviction of the students for breach of the peace, the court rules, deprived them of their right to free speech and assembly.

Feb. 26—The Court studies the problem of whether the New York Stock Exchange is liable to suit under the antitrust legislation.

Feb. 27—The Court discusses the constitutionality of prayers in the public schools, in a hearing of the first of two new prayer cases.

VATICAN, THE

Feb. 2—British Prime Minister Harold Mac-

millan visits Pope John XXIII in the Vatican on a "courtesy call."

VENEZUELA

Feb. 12—It is reported that there is revolutionary terrorism in Venezuela, apparently designed to harass President Romulo Betancourt's government.

Feb. 16—A hijacked Venezuelan ship, *Anzoategui*, is located by a U.S. Navy plane. The freighter is heading toward the Brazil coast. The ship is asked to turn to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The ship was seized 4 days ago by members of the National Liberation Armed Forces whose aim is to overthrow Betancourt.

Feb. 19—U.S. President Kennedy welcomes Betancourt in Washington with high praise for his government.

Feb. 20—Speaking in Washington at the National Press Club, Betancourt urges a blockade on all intercourse with Cuba.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Feb. 4—It is reported that U.S. special forces have set up a camp at the foot of a Viet Cong (pro-Communist) rebel stronghold.

YEMEN

Feb. 12—The British Foreign office discloses that Yemen has requested that Britain withdraw her mission there.

Feb. 21—It is reported in Washington that U.S. and Western diplomats believe that U.A.R. President Nasser is building up his forces in Yemen. (See also U.A.R.)

Feb. 26—The British government announces that British colonial troops have forced back Yemeni forces from disputed territory on the northern border of the South Arabia Federation.

U.N. Secretary General U Thant announces that he is sending Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph J. Bunche to Yemen at once, in an effort to end the crisis there.

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